Relations between the United States and Israel are rapidly deteriorating. Analysis
Relations between the United States and Israel are experiencing the most serious crisis in many decades. Washington is increasingly at odds with Tel Aviv on Iran and regional security issues, and support for Israel no longer seems unconditional among American politicians. Why one of the key alliances of the Middle East is being transformed and how it will affect the entire region is in the Izvestia article.
A turn in politics
• Relations between Israel and the United States, which have been considered virtually inviolable for decades, are increasingly causing alarm in Israel itself. The reason was the desire of American President Donald Trump to conclude an agreement with Iran, his public criticism of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as well as the results of the Democratic Party primaries in New York, where several candidates with a tough pro-Palestinian position won.
• More and more American politicians openly accuse Israel of genocide and apartheid, and such statements are being made even in New York— the largest Jewish city in the world outside of Israel (more than 1 million people. There are about 600,000 Jews in Jerusalem and about 450,000 in Tel Aviv). This indicates a serious change in public sentiment.
• The new tough stance of the White House reflects the changing public sentiment in the United States. Support for Israel among American voters, including young Republicans, is declining, so policy must take into account the new reality. According to polls, in 2025, for the first time, Americans' sympathies for the Palestinians exceeded their sympathies for Israel, and a Pew Research study showed that negative attitudes towards Israel increased from 42% in 2022 to 60% in April 2026.
• The problem also lies in the general change in the position of the Democratic Party. Attitudes towards Israel have become one of the central themes of American foreign policy and may play an important role in the 2028 presidential election. There is a growing view among Democrats that Israel no longer shares common human rights values with the United States, and a growing belief among Republicans that Israel is dragging the United States into its conflicts, including the confrontation with Iran. The United States is increasingly asking whether Israel remains a strategic asset or is turning into a political liability.
• The cooling of relations is already noticeable. In 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Washington five times, while in 2026, only one visit took place in February, with no new meetings scheduled at the White House yet. The number of telephone contacts between the leaders of the two countries has also significantly decreased, and the expert community believes that tensions can only increase.
• In addition, during the escalation of the situation in the Middle East, it became obvious that Israel did not want to unconditionally follow the instructions of the United States. In particular, Tel Aviv stated that the army would not leave southern Lebanon even if the United States demanded it. In Lebanon, in turn, it was recalled that the Iranian delegation at the talks with the United States called Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon one of the conditions for further settlement of relations between Washington and Tehran.
• The White House continues to declare the strength of the American-Israeli alliance and emphasizes the contribution of the Donald Trump administration in support of Israel. Nevertheless, the statements of US Vice President Jay Dee Vance have become noticeably tougher: in particular, he warned that Israel has almost no influential allies left except the United States, and warned that the country should not enter into conflict with the only remaining partner. He also recalled the significant American contribution to the defense of Israel, making it clear that the nature of these relations should not be considered unchanged.
Even before taking office as vice president, Vance repeatedly said that the interests of the United States and Israel do not always coincide and that America should not get involved in a war with Iran for the sake of an ally. The Israeli leadership preferred to interact directly with Donald Trump and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, hoping that Vance's views would remain secondary. However, his key role in the negotiations with Iran has shown that his influence has grown significantly.
• The new agreements between the United States and Iran are in line with the Trump administration's desire to lower oil prices and restore the safety of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, but do not address Israel's key concerns related to Iran's missile program and security threat. In recent months, Donald Trump has become much more strident towards Benjamin Netanyahu and even achieved Israel's rejection of some military plans in Lebanon, which Vance had previously sought.
• After the joint US and Israeli strikes on Iran, the Israeli leadership hoped that the alliance with Washington was entering a new stage. However, four months later, there is growing concern in Israel that the country will have to act with significantly less American support. Israel expected that Donald Trump would make an exception for Tel Aviv in his "America first" policy, but this did not happen. Now Israel is seen in Washington as one of the allies of the United States, and not as a partner with a special status.
The future of relationships
• The current Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel, signed in 2016, defines a ten-year military assistance program for the period from 2019 to 2028. This is the largest bilateral military assistance agreement in the history of the United States.
• The agreement provides for the annual allocation of $3.3 billion to Israel under the Foreign Military Financing program, as well as $500 million for joint missile defense. The total amount of financing over ten years is $38 billion. About 25% of FMF funds were initially allowed to be spent inside Israel through the Offshore Procurement (OSP) mechanism, which provided the local defense industry with approximately $825 million annually.
• By 2028, the OSP mechanism will be completely discontinued. After that, American funds will be used almost exclusively for the purchase of American-made weapons. This deprives Israeli companies of guaranteed domestic financing and forces them to look for a new model of cooperation with the United States.
• Against the background of growing pro-Palestinian sentiments in the United States, Netanyahu and other Israeli officials suggest that Washington abandon the grant model. Instead of grants through the State Department, it is planned to move towards deeper integration of Israeli companies into Pentagon programs: joint development, technology licensing, joint production, long-term contracts and arms maintenance.
• Such a transition makes support less visible politically. If today military aid is discussed annually by Congress and is under the control of the State Department, then in the new model, funding will flow through the US defense budget, where decisions are made based on combat readiness, production capabilities and needs of the armed forces, rather than foreign policy considerations. Formally, this will allow the White House to declare its refusal to help Israel, although the volume of cooperation may continue or even increase.
• However, against the background of political differences, Israel can no longer be sure that the United States will support it as unconditionally as before, namely, to receive military aid annually (from 1946 to 2023, Washington transferred about $206 billion to Tel Aviv), as well as diplomatic protection, including traditional American vetoes in the Security Council. The United Nations and tax incentives for charities supporting Israel.
• The political future of Benjamin Netanyahu before the October 27 parliamentary elections increasingly depends on the White House, while the debate continues within the US Republican Party about the future of relations with Israel, and the position of Jaydi Vance is becoming one of the key factors in this discussion.
Impact on the region
The cooling of relations between the United States and Israel will change the balance of power in the Middle East. Israel will have to adapt more to Washington's position when making military and foreign policy decisions. The United States will probably continue to rely on diplomacy and negotiations to prevent another major war. This will strengthen the role of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Oman, which are actively involved in resolving regional crises and are interested in stability.
• Israel is expected to coordinate more actively with the Arab States, which also consider Iran to be one of the main threats. At the same time, the countries of the region will begin to rely more on their own forces and regional alliances, in particular, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf and the League of Arab States. As a result, the Middle East will become a more complex political system, where the influence of one external player will no longer be as decisive as before.
• Even if relations with Israel deteriorate, the United States will maintain a wide network of allies in the region. Washington will continue to cooperate with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan and Egypt. American military bases and logistics centers operate on the territory of these countries, which allow the United States to control key sea routes and maintain a military presence in the Middle East.
• Iran is still Washington's main opponent, so the United States will also continue to counter pro-Iranian groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. At the same time, against the background of the constant instability of the Middle East region, it is unlikely that a complete rupture of American-Israeli cooperation can be expected. Rather, Washington will pursue a more pragmatic policy, trying to maintain its influence on all key players in the region at once and reduce the risk of new armed conflicts.
When writing the material, Izvestia took into account the opinions of:
● Orientalist-Americanist Alexander Kargin.
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