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- Something began to starve: because of the Iranian war, the world will run out of food
Something began to starve: because of the Iranian war, the world will run out of food
Concerns about global food security began to surface immediately after the start of the campaign against Iran. Two months later, oil and gas tankers are idle in the Persian Gulf, but supermarket shelves in developed (and developing) countries remain full, and wheat and corn futures are showing only moderate growth. But the danger remains more than real, which is confirmed by the sentiments at the headquarters of global agrotraders and international organizations. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) explicitly warns of an "impending catastrophe." Details about the upcoming food crisis can be found in the Izvestia article.
Deceptive calmness
At first glance, the food markets show a certain calmness. For example, the FAO food price index rose by only 2.4% in March, while grain prices rose by 1.5%. Wheat and corn futures on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange predict a very moderate price increase by the end of the year (in the range of 4-5%).
But the lack of panic in the markets today is a consequence of the record shifting grain stocks (over 951 million tons) formed in previous calm seasons. What we eat now was grown before the start of the US and Israeli military operation against Iran. Its real impact on food security will become clear during the harvest of 2026-2027, when the price of bread will include today's sky-high tariffs for freight, fuel and fertilizers.
Modern industrial agriculture is essentially the process of converting fossil hydrocarbons into food calories. The blocking of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a third of the world's seaborne fertilizer trade and a fifth of oil and LNG exports pass, has harmed this process in two places at once.
The first and most important problem is mineral fertilizers. The Persian Gulf countries control almost half of the world's exports of carbamide (urea), the main source of nitrogen for plants. The closure of ports physically removes these volumes from the market. The situation is aggravated by an indirect effect: the shortage of liquefied natural gas in Europe and Asia has led to a sharp jump in prices for gas, which is the main raw material for the synthesis of ammonia. About 40% of the recent drop in global gas demand has been attributed to fertilizer plants, which are simply shutting down due to unprofitability.
The second link is logistics and diesel fuel. Tractors, combine harvesters, and bulk carriers do not operate on political declarations. The spike in oil prices above $100 per barrel has directly increased the operating costs of farmers and agricultural holdings around the world. The lengthening of sea routes bypassing the Cape of Good Hope makes the transportation of bulk agricultural goods significantly more expensive.
The congestion in the Panama Canal, which is already experiencing capacity problems, has increased due to the fact that Asian buyers preferred crude oil exported by the United States from the Gulf of Mexico to supplies from the Middle East. As a result, oil tankers outbid the bids of dry cargo ships in the struggle for scarce slots for passage through the channel. Because of this, ships carrying less expensive goods (such as grain) face rising freight costs and delays. The waiting time in the channel has increased to about 40 days, as oil tanker operators pay millions of dollars to pass out of line. On some grain transportation routes, freight costs have already increased by 50-60%.
Farmers in the Northern Hemisphere are now making decisions about spring sowing. Faced with an increase in the price of fertilizers by 20% or more, farmers will save on their application. Even if the acreage is not reduced, savings on chemicals are guaranteed to lead to a drop in yields. The world will receive less grain in the fall at a higher cost.
Uneven vulnerability
"Agrarian inflation" will be extremely unevenly distributed across the planet. Developed countries will absorb this shock by redistributing household spending and government subsidies, although food inflation there will inevitably boost overall consumer price indices, tying the hands of central banks in lowering rates.
A much less pleasant situation is expected in the countries of the Global South. For low-income countries, where food costs account for up to 50% of the family budget, the rising cost of energy is already hitting their pockets through higher logistics costs. Analysts point out that in Dhaka, Cairo or Lagos, families are already forced to give up vegetables, fruits and animal protein in favor of empty carbohydrates.
The FAO lists Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Egypt, and East African countries (Somalia, Kenya, and Sudan) as the highest risk countries. The World Food Program estimates that prolonging the conflict until the middle of summer will lead to another 45 million people experiencing shortages. An additional risk factor is the currency problem. Rising oil prices strengthen the US dollar, which makes food purchases for developing countries, whose national currencies are weakening, twice as expensive.
From corn to greenhouse vegetables
The structure of agricultural costs exposes certain segments to greater risk. The main victim of the "nitrogen famine" is corn, which is the most feed—dependent basic grain crop. A drop in its yield will trigger a domino effect in the meat and dairy industries, as corn is the foundation of global feed production.
The second segment is greenhouse vegetable growing in Europe and Asia, whose business model is based on burning cheap gas for heating and generating CO2. At current tariffs, indoor production of tomatoes and cucumbers is becoming unprofitable.
The scarcity and/or high cost of raw materials creates competition for it, which creates a problem for fertilizer producers themselves. Vijay Chakravarty, Risk Director at Louis Dreyfus Company, notes that agrochemistry is losing the battle for sulfur to more marginal industries (for example, copper smelting). Fertilizer producers end up at the end of the queue, which exacerbates the physical shortage. The market will resolve this situation, but only over time, and fertilizers are needed here and now.
Russia is at a crossroads
Russia's position in the current crisis looks ambivalent. Our country is the largest exporter of wheat and, being completely self-sufficient in gas, fuel and mineral fertilizers, should become the main beneficiary of the situation. Russian farmers are not dependent on the Strait of Hormuz, and domestic prices for energy and chemicals are hedged by government regulation.
A complex of internal problems prevents the Russian agro-industrial complex from converting this advantage into a large-scale increase in production and export revenues. Agriculture in the Russian Federation has been experiencing considerable difficulties over the past two years. The tight monetary policy of the Central Bank has made revolving loans extremely expensive for farmers. Technological sanctions have complicated the maintenance of imported agricultural machinery and access to high-quality seed stock. As a result, in 2025, food exports decreased compared to the previous year, amounting to 41.5 billion dollars. For the first time in several years, the country has become a net importer of food products.
The current price increase gives farmers an opportunity to cheer up. But at the same time it creates an additional threat — new export embargoes. In the context of an agricultural price shock, governments are prone to protectionism in order to protect the domestic market. If global wheat prices go up, the Russian authorities, fearing the transfer of inflation to the shelves of domestic stores, are highly likely to resort to strict export quotas or a complete ban on grain exports.
This tactic, which has already been used during past crises (both in Russia, India, China, and even a number of European countries), can work as a panic multiplier. The withdrawal of tens of millions of tons of Russian or Indian grain from the global market will instantly send futures up, exacerbating the global shortage.
If the Gulf's logistical and energy blockade is not fully lifted in the coming weeks, the world will enter the harvest season with a shortage of basic resources, turning the current energy crisis into a food crisis. The political and social consequences of such events will be felt far beyond 2026.
Переведено сервисом «Яндекс Переводчик»
