There are no winners in the conflict between the United States and Iran. And here's why
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- There are no winners in the conflict between the United States and Iran. And here's why
The United States and Iran have signed a memorandum that paves the way for a peace agreement between them. In addition to the fact that the parties commit to cease hostilities, the United States agreed to lift the naval blockade and sanctions against Iran, as well as to develop a plan providing for the allocation of $ 300 billion to restore the recent enemy. In return, Iran will abandon the development of nuclear weapons and discuss the fate of its existing enriched uranium. Why such an agreement fixes the loss of both sides is described in the Izvestia article.
Losses for the USA
• The memorandum implies that the United States will gradually ease sanctions against Iran, primarily related to its oil exports. The relief will take effect immediately and will increase over the course of the 60-day negotiation process, and the final lifting of all sanctions will be possible after the signing of the final agreement. Iran will be able to sell crude oil, petrochemical products and their derivatives. Related logistics, transportation and insurance services will also be withdrawn from US sanctions.
• This may have pleasant economic consequences for the United States for a while.: lower oil prices, easing inflationary pressures, an opportunity to ease monetary policy, and a return of optimism to the markets. However, the lifting of sanctions and the opening of the Strait of Hormuz will not return the oil market to its pre-war state. The damage caused to the entire global economy will lead to a reduction in oil consumption, and the release of large amounts of oil and an increase in its production, which producers will resort to to compensate for losses, will lead to a collapse in prices. They will remain at an acceptable level for some time while countries rebuild their strategic reserves for the future.
• However, without steady growth in the global economy, oil prices will continue to fall and at one point cross the threshold at which shale oil production in the United States becomes unprofitable and will lead to the closure of fields. Light Iranian oil, which has a minimum cost, will displace expensive American oil from the market. Iran will receive impressive additional funding, which is unlikely to benefit the United States, since the current regime can use it to strengthen its defense capabilities and support its allies.
• A noticeable disadvantage of the memorandum for the United States will be the cooling in relations with Israel. The most loyal ally in the Middle East does not accept the agreement with Iran. Either this will result in a change of the current government in the next elections, or in a refusal to fulfill the obligations that the White House will ask for. Israel has already insisted that it will not withdraw troops from Lebanon, as Iran wants and the White House has agreed to. The United States will have to put pressure on Israel again and resort to methods that will create a rift in the decades-long mutually beneficial friendship between the two countries. At the same time, Washington will continue to maintain relations with more practical players in the Middle East, who welcome the signing of the agreement with Iran and look forward to the restoration of peace in the Persian Gulf region.
• The memorandum makes no mention of Iran's numerous allies who support it in the conflict with Israel. No formations in Iraq, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip and Yemen are limited in their actions and will remain troublemakers in the Middle East. Maintaining their presence is becoming a lever of pressure from Iran, and is one of the main failures of the past negotiations for the United States. The fact that Washington was unable to break Tehran still has its explanations, but the fact that the Americans cannot deprive relatively small armed groups of subjectivity calls into question the ability of the United States to significantly influence the situation in the Middle East.
• Against this background, the political consequences for the US leadership are also taking on a negative connotation. The Donald Trump administration has failed to achieve many of its stated goals, such as regime change in Iran and the cessation of oil exports, violated its election promise not to start a war, and acquired a negative image in many countries around the world. The pre-war state in which the United States was located is unequivocally assessed in the country itself as better than the one in which it found itself after the end of the war with Iran. It is unlikely to be included in the list of achievements of Trump's second term, as there is a strong feeling among Americans that the White House has achieved nothing for the United States, but has made many concessions to Iran.
Losses for Iran
• The signing of the agreement and the end of the war do not look like an unequivocal success for Iran either. Although Tehran has achieved notable preferences for itself, it has also had to make some concessions and abandon its maximalist demands. Even at the beginning of the war, when the country's leadership suffered heavy losses, political and military leaders died one after another, the surviving elite broadcast the idea that these victims would be avenged, as well as significant civilian casualties.
• Although it was not possible to inflict such damage on the United States, the remaining leadership was aimed at at least carrying out equivalent retaliation against Israel, however, it did not suffer significant losses. The Iranian regime has undergone changes, and the center of power has shifted from the religious elite to the military. Her willingness to accept the losses inflicted by the two main ideological opponents deprives the current leadership of a certain amount of legitimacy in the eyes of the population and in the future may again lead to protests that will raise questions about the meaning of the hardships caused by the war.
• The opening of the Strait of Hormuz will also be a consequence that not everyone in Iran will agree with. For some time, due to the blocking of the Strait, Tehran remained in the center of world attention, it owned a resource that directly affected the state of world trade. By releasing these reins, Iran is returning to its usual place in the geopolitical hierarchy. The rest of the world will learn from the closure of Hormuz and take measures to ensure that oil and gas from the Persian Gulf are no longer stuck at the behest of the Iranian leadership. Having given up this leverage, Tehran is less likely to be able to use it in the future.
The renunciation of nuclear weapons, explicitly stated in the memorandum, also leaves Iran in a more vulnerable position than before. The example of the DPRK shows Tehran that the possession of nuclear weapons is the only guaranteed deterrent against external invasion. Without it, Iran risks being subjected to aggression again, which it will not be able to respond to proportionally. The memorandum also provides for steps that will set back Iran's nuclear program for many years, so it will take a very long time to regain lost ground. Moreover, the right to enrich uranium is perceived in Iran as a matter of sovereignty, and giving it up would be tantamount to surrender.
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