The share of oil and gas revenues in Russia's GDP is decreasing. What you need to know

In recent years, the contribution of the oil and gas sector to Russia's GDP has noticeably decreased: if in 2022 this figure was at about 42%, now it is about 23%. The role of oil and gas revenues in the country's budget has also significantly decreased — previously they provided about 50% of the revenue, but now they provide about 20%. Why the change in the share of oil and gas in Russia's GDP is important for the economy is in the Izvestia article.

Changing the revenue structure

• The Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation recorded a 38.30% drop in oil and gas budget revenues in January–April 2026 to 2.30 trillion rubles. while simultaneously increasing non-oil and gas revenues by 10.20% to 9.42 trillion rubles. This dynamic shows a redistribution of the federal budget revenue structure towards the domestic economy and non-resource sources. As a result, the share of oil and gas in the formation of the revenue base is decreasing, and the budget's dependence on commodity exports is weakening. This creates new conditions for the economy, where industry, services and domestic demand are beginning to play an important role while maintaining the importance of the oil and gas sector.

• The reduction in the share of oil and gas revenues has made the federal budget more sustainable. By the end of 2025, oil and gas revenues accounted for 22.7% of all revenues, which is the lowest figure in the last ten years and almost half the level of 2015.

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• In 2025, the federal budget received almost 37.3 trillion rubles in revenue. Of this amount, about 8.5 trillion rubles were provided by the oil and gas sector, while 28.8 trillion rubles came from other sources, forming 77.3% of the revenue. For comparison, in 2024, the total revenue was 36.7 trillion rubles, of which 11.1 trillion rubles, or 30.3%, accounted for oil and gas.

• The growth of non-oil and gas revenues and the expansion of income sources have continued for many years. The stability of the budget system is ensured by the budget rule, reducing the role of the raw materials sector, increasing tax collection and more efficient management of state assets. Thanks to these changes, the federal budget today is significantly less dependent on fluctuations in global commodity prices than it was ten years ago.

Combating commodity dependence

• The Russian budget should reduce its dependence on oil and gas revenues due to the high volatility of the commodity market and the impact of sanctions. The state will increase revenues through the expansion of non-primary exports, the growth of domestic production and the whitewashing of the economy.

• In particular, the growth of non-oil and gas revenues is generated by expanding export potential, developing production and introducing digital labeling of goods, which in certain groups increases revenues by 20-30% in a few months. There are already 31 product groups operating in the system, and 16 more are undergoing an experiment. These measures increase the tax base and reduce pressure on the budget, making the revenue structure more stable and predictable.

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• Also, starting in 2027, the Russian Federation plans to gradually reduce the base price of oil in the budget rule to strengthen financial stability and replenish the NWF. Despite the fact that the budget deficit in 2026 may be higher than the planned 3.8 trillion rubles or 1.6% of GDP, a significant increase in borrowing beyond the planned 5.5 trillion rubles is not expected. In a favorable market situation, the NWF is able to grow by 1 trillion rubles, and by 2029 the authorities expect to achieve zero structural deficit.

• A decrease in the base oil price may support budget revenues and exporters, but at the same time it may lead to a weakening of the ruble and increased inflationary pressures. In such circumstances, the Bank of Russia may lower the key rate more cautiously, and investors will have to buy back additional OFZs.

• At the same time, the new guidelines of the Ministry of Finance make budget policy more understandable for the market and the regulator. Additional sources of financing, including privatization, tax changes, and the use of remaining funds, may limit the need for new borrowings. With the Urals price at $70 per barrel and an average exchange rate of 75 rubles per dollar, the budget deficit in 2026 may approach 2.5% of GDP, and additional borrowing will amount to 1-1.5 trillion rubles. Against this background, there remains the potential for further reduction of the key rate and reduction of OFZ yields by the end of the year.

When writing the material, Izvestia took into account the opinions of:

• Dmitry Alexandrov, Head of the Analytical Research Department at AVI Capital;
• Dmitry Polevoy, Director of Investments at Astra Asset Management.