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- Fortune is fickle: how Perestroika defeated the profitable Soviet automobile industry
Fortune is fickle: how Perestroika defeated the profitable Soviet automobile industry
On April 8, 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev uttered the word that became the password of an entire era — "perestroika." It is symbolic that this happened in Tolyatti, at a meeting with car manufacturers. Gorbachev considered mechanical engineering in general (and automobile manufacturing in particular) to be a key industry for the country's development. Izvestia recalls the details.
"We need to start with perestroika..."
Speaking to the staff of the Volga Automobile Plant, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU stated: "We need to start with a restructuring in thinking and psychology, in organization, in style and ways of working. Frankly, if we do not rebuild ourselves, I am deeply convinced of this, we will not rebuild both the economy and our social life."
By the mid-1980s, Soviet engineering presented a contradictory picture. On the one hand, huge production facilities have been created. On the other hand, the Soviet economy was strategically heavily dependent on energy exports and projects related to the extraction and transportation of oil and gas. Mechanical engineering, against the background of large-scale development of resource bases, developed according to the residual principle. A third factor is also important: the socialist economy, as it developed by the mid-1970s, has largely exhausted its capabilities.
Many people remember the slogan of the first years of Gorbachev's reforms — "Acceleration". It was about the accelerated development of the economy and, above all, mechanical engineering, which Mikhail Gorbachev considered a key link in the Soviet industry. In 1986, the 12th five-year plan began. A colossal sum was allocated to machine builders — 200 billion rubles, twice as much as in the previous decade. They went, among other things, to purchase modern technologies from the West.
The most ambitious plans were announced. National income was expected to double in 15 years and labor productivity to double in two and a half times. The twelfth five-year plan was dubbed the "second Industrialization" in advance. The transition from the production of machines performing individual operations to production complexes and industrial robots. They talked about automation of production, the introduction of computers, and at the same time about improving labor discipline, which was associated with another key slogan of the time.: "Sobriety is the norm of life." In order to control manufacturers, in 1986 they introduced state acceptance — commissions that meticulously checked the quality of products. According to economists, with the planned pace of development, in 5-7 years at least 85% of Soviet civil engineering products will reach the level of world standards.
The breakthrough of car manufacturers
Despite the generally skeptical — and objective — assessments of the results of perestroika, it must be admitted that the automotive industry was on the rise in those years. The demand for cars was huge, both among private owners and among enterprises. Both were willing to buy domestic cars in large quantities and even at higher prices.
At that time, the USSR was the fifth largest car manufacturer in the world after the USA, Japan, Germany and France. Powerful dump trucks and trucks, massive buses and, of course, passenger cars were produced in our country. The well-known Zhiguli, Volga and Moskvichi cars were very expensive by the standards of average incomes at that time, but people were willing to stand in queues for years for the right to purchase these cars.
It is a significant fact that in the late 1980s, after a 20-year pause, active economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and China was restored. China was undergoing economic reform. The country was moving to market-oriented tracks, and small businesses were developing in Chinese. But mechanical engineering remained in its infancy. And representatives of Chinese firms and departments literally besieged the reception rooms of the directors of the Soviet auto giants with proposals for large purchases. They were interested in cars, technologies, and spare parts... Both KAMAZ trucks, Ural trucks, and Soviet passenger cars were very popular in China at that time. Chinese engineers and manufacturers learned a lot from Soviet designers.
Back in the 1990s, traveling through Europe and Asia, one could see the indirect consequences of the accelerated development of Soviet engineering. On the highways of Poland, Spain, and even Germany, it was not difficult to meet KAMAZ trucks, Nivas, Ladas, and Volgs... These brands were known and respected in the world. Of course, the popularity of domestic models abroad was influenced by dumping prices. Nevertheless, this fact speaks to the serious — and not fully realized — opportunities of the Soviet industry.
Stop, the car
Mechanical engineering in the USSR was profitable. Each enterprise was guaranteed to justify its existence by delivering its products on the mountain. But the government, and society, expected a quick effect from colossal investments in the industry, but this did not happen, and could not happen. At the same time, export revenues were declining due to falling oil prices on the world market. As a result, investments in the modernization of mechanical engineering have practically stopped. Many of the most important projects were interrupted "on take-off". This resulted in the fact that sometimes factory equipment purchased in the West turned out to be unclaimed. The projects could not be brought to mind, the construction of new conveyors was frozen... Unpacked machinery gathering dust in warehouses has become a symbol of economic impotence.
I must say that Mikhail Gorbachev did not have a reputation as an expert in the industrial field. Both by education and by biography, he was associated with agriculture, and this is a completely different specificity. At the same time, unlike in the Brezhnev era, when members of the Politburo played a significant role in big politics, starting with Chairman of the Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin, during the years of "perestroika" Gorbachev's associates did not include independent-minded specialists, literate and influential technocrats.
The great nationwide construction site was the Kama Automobile Plant at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s, or rather, a conglomerate of enterprises that produced modern heavy trucks. In the second half of the 1980s, KAMAZ gained solid production rates, producing more than 100,000 heavy trucks annually. The year 1988 was a record year for the plant, when mechanical engineering was really in high esteem — then KAMAZ managed to produce almost 127 thousand trucks. In 1990, 116,400 cars rolled off the main assembly line in Naberezhnye Chelny, which is also a very high figure.
After the collapse of the Soviet economy, production at the factory will collapse almost six times. A similar situation developed at the Volga and Ulyanovsk automobile plants, in Minsk and Kremenchuk, in Miass and Izhevsk. The largest car companies, having lost reliable government support, were forced to patch holes in their own budgets, relying on the rapid implementation of inexpensive but outdated models. Serious modernization of production proved to be unprofitable. Counting on a decade ahead in the face of political turmoil is too much of a luxury for a manufacturer.
Gorbachev and his associates failed to calculate the squaring of the circle and find the secret of the perpetual motion machine: an attempt to simultaneously rely on the development of mechanical engineering and radical political reform led to unpredictable results. By the end of the 1980s, the successes of car factories (and they were!) They just got out of the public eye. Other disturbing motives outweighed them: the surge in crime and extremism, the growth of national separatism, and the shortage of essential goods. The country seemed to be plunging into chaos. I became disillusioned with Gorbachev's policies. Having lost public support, the first and last president of the USSR failed to stop the process of destruction of the country. This is the objective—and sad—truth.
Work on bugs
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev admitted that the attempt to accelerate the development of mechanical engineering was a mistake. After the fact, he believed that it would be more correct to start transformations with agriculture, light industry and food industry. This would help reduce the commodity deficit and in a few years demonstrate tangible economic success to society.
The rise of mechanical engineering did not help the Soviet Union to overcome its problems triumphantly. Tactical successes did not bring strategic advancement. One of the reasons for this failure is, of course, the crisis of power that engulfed the system after 1989.
If you can't learn from other people's mistakes, you have to analyze your own... One of the lessons of perestroika is the understanding that tasks such as modernizing industrial giants require consistency and patience, and it is better to change the economic structure in a country in conditions of political stability. Well, mechanical engineering is indeed the most important branch of the industry, and much depends on its development today. This includes the economic sovereignty of the country.
The author is the deputy editor—in-chief of the magazine "Historian"
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