Return to Muscat: what is interesting about the third round of Iranian-American talks
On April 26, the third round of negotiations between Iran and the United States took place. As for the first time, the delegations met in the capital of Oman, Muscat. Since the last meeting in Rome, the parties have increased the frequency of contacts and even managed to exchange interim proposals in the hope of seizing the initiative (thanks to such "half-steps") and advancing their vision of the final contours of the deal. The activities of experts from the technical groups also contributed positively. And although everyone stays on their own in the end, the focus on dialogue still prevails.
How was the meeting in Muscat?
Despite the fact that even for the third time the parties preferred indirect interaction, the number of communication formats and their effectiveness have significantly expanded.
In particular, the meeting of the Iranian and American delegations was preceded by extensive technical consultations, during which the general provisions of a potential agreement on the Iranian nuclear program were discussed.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi arrives in Muscat, Oman, ahead of talks with the United States
It is noteworthy that this time the national teams included experts in the field of economics: several experts on sanctions were present from the Iranian side, and Michael Anton, a recognized expert on economic planning and investments, from the American side.
The negotiation process almost dragged on for two days — the technical teams raised a large number of questions and almost reached the second round. However, at the last moment, they decided to take a break for additional consultations.
Intermediate steps
Even before the start of the negotiations in Muscat, it became noticeable that both the Iranians and the Americans were following a "half—step" tactic - offering options that were not comprehensive, but were already potentially acceptable to themselves.
Thus, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi proposed to his American colleagues to conclude an interim version of the nuclear deal. He explained such a broad gesture, among other things, by his intention to support President Donald Trump's plans to resolve tensions over the Iranian nuclear program either in the first 100 days of his presidency or no more than 60 days after the start of the first Iranian-American talks. In addition, the interim deal was supposed to demonstrate the real willingness of both sides to reach a compromise and consolidate the results of the first two rounds of negotiations.
However, the proposal did not arouse much enthusiasm among the US representatives. The US president's special envoy, Steve Witkoff, reacted cautiously to his Iranian counterpart's initiative and promised to return to the consideration of the interim deal if he received such a command from above.
As an alternative, the United States has put forward its proposals to Iran, including its willingness to grant Tehran the right to a civilian nuclear program as part of a potential deal, but on condition that it is based solely on imported nuclear fuel.
In fact, Washington offered Iran a model that had already been tested earlier, with the help of which it was possible to dispel fears about the UAE's nuclear ambitions. Today, Abu Dhabi purchases nuclear fuel abroad in order to keep several reactors running, but it does not enrich uranium on its own, does not recycle spent fuel (SNF), and does not extract plutonium that could be used to produce nuclear warheads. The United States is convinced that this option will work in the case of Iran.
However, the US negotiators (accidentally or intentionally) forgot that such a proposal contradicts the original nuclear deal, under which Tehran was granted the right to independently enrich and store up to 300 kg of enriched uranium for 15 years (that is, until at least 2030). Moreover, the rather low enrichment threshold (3.67%) established under the first deal excluded the possibility of using Iran's nuclear infrastructure for the production of ammunition, but did not prevent the supply of fuel for power units or the enrichment of uranium for scientific purposes.
The restrictions proposed by the United States threaten to deprive Iran of the opportunity to develop a civilian nuclear sector, making the country dependent on external supplies of raw materials. Even the promised easing of economic sanctions by Washington will not be able to cover the losses from such hypothetical changes. It is not surprising that Iranian politicians have criticized the Emirati scheme, calling it enslaving and contrary to national interests.
In the third negotiation cycle, Tehran and Washington entered each in their own way.
The Unpredictable Trump
At first glance, it may seem that the United States is gradually getting tired of negotiations with Tehran and is increasingly inclined towards an escalatory scenario, and journalistic leaks from the White House about the heated debate over the Iranian issue only strengthen this conviction.
American President Donald Trump is also adding fuel to the fire, constantly promising that "something bad will happen" to Iran if the parties fail to reach a compromise, as well as threatening to support an Israeli preemptive strike on Iranian territory.
US President Donald Trump
At the same time, Trump alternates threats with peacemaking intentions, often within the same speech. In particular, at a briefing where a threat was voiced to support an Israeli hypothetical strike on Iran's territory, the American leader expressed his willingness to meet with Iran's top leadership to discuss political issues and the contours of a new nuclear deal.
Such statements demonstrate that the Republican administration has not yet developed a clear position on the ultimate goal of the negotiations and the content of the new version of the nuclear deal. Although public tensions between the "hawks" led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and supporters of "detente", Vice President Jay Dee Vance and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff have become less noticeable.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio
In addition, Washington has decided on a key red line in the negotiations, which it broadcasts externally: Iran should not possess nuclear weapons. The issues of Tehran's development of the missile program or its support for the "axis of resistance" are gradually fading into the background.
The Israeli factor
Much more attention is focused on Israel as the least predictable force whose interests are affected by a potential nuclear deal. There remains a belief among Israeli elites that Iran is continuing to work on its atomic arsenal and is using negotiations with the United States as a cover, although such conclusions are dictated rather by personal concerns of the Israeli right and are at odds with the assessments of the IAEA and American intelligence agencies.
A strike on the Iranian infrastructure, albeit limited, is still seen by Tel Aviv as the only possible option. However, the Israelis have recently been trying not to promote the idea of an imminent strike too much, so as not to spoil the negotiating atmosphere in Muscat. For example, the country's Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, in an interview with The Telegraph, denied rumors that Tel Aviv was planning to attack Iran's nuclear program facilities as early as May. At the same time, Saar stressed that the country is "ready for any scenario," including a military one.
At the same time, Israeli rhetoric does not have much influence on the vector of negotiations, as it is perceived by both Tehran and Washington as characteristic and permanent.
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