Boarding: the United States is preparing to seize Iranian tankers according to the laws of the 19th century

The United States is considering the possibility of using the 19th-century Maritime prize law, which would simplify the seizure of Iranian oil tankers. Earlier, Washington announced its intention to rely not on new strikes against the Islamic Republic, but on strengthening the naval blockade and sanctions. The sale of seized oil could help the United States offset some of the costs of the war, which have already exceeded $37.5 billion. But the result may be unexpected: oil will rise in price, transportation will become more dangerous, and outright piracy will actually return to the sea. Details can be found in the Izvestia article.

The war trophy

The United States decided to recall the "prize right", which the maritime powers actively used in the XVIII–XIX centuries. According to Bloomberg, the Ministry of Justice is preparing to use the "ancient code of maritime law" to simplify the seizure of Iranian oil tankers and their cargo. The agency is developing the initiative in coordination with the Pentagon, its goal is to strengthen the blockade of Iran and at the same time partially offset the costs of the war.

"In the interests of national security, it may be necessary for the US armed forces to seize ships or cargo supporting the enemy during a military conflict," the agency quoted Houston prosecutor Aaron Reitz as saying. "If this happens, our federal courts should be ready to rule on the fate of the seized vessels and cargo."

Currently, the Ministry of Justice uses civil procedures to confiscate ships and cargo related to Iran, which may take a long time due to claims from shipowners and other countries. The agency cites as an example the case of a captured Venezuelan supertanker related to supplies in the interests of Tehran. Several parties claimed his ship and cargo at once, as a result, the sale of property was delayed.

The "prize right" should make the process noticeably easier. The scheme itself may look like this: the US military detains a ship or cargo; prosecutors appeal to a federal court demanding that the production be recognized as a "US prize"; in case of a satisfactory response, the cargo, for example, oil, becomes state property. It can be sold, and the money can be sent directly to the treasury. Moreover, we can talk not only about Iranian ships, but also about neutral ones if Washington considers that they are helping the enemy or violating the blockade.

The Federal Court of the Southern District of Texas may become a platform for considering such cases. Next to it is the port of Houston and the country's largest petrochemical complex capable of receiving and storing large volumes of oil. It is the prosecutor's office of this district that is currently involved in the preparation of the new scheme.

Washington, in fact, wants to return the mechanism that was actively used back in the 19th century. The "prize" courts tried cases of ships and cargoes captured during the war and could recognize them as war trophies with subsequent sale. In the United States, this practice came to naught after the Spanish-American War of 1898. Then the passenger steamer Panama, which caught the beginning of the war on a voyage, was captured by the Americans off the coast of Cuba. Later, the court recognized him as a "military prize."

Naval battle

The United States has plenty of opportunities for such hunting. Back in July, Washington resumed the naval blockade of Iranian ports, which was supposed to block Tehran's main source of income — oil exports. The oil sector provides about 30-40% of the revenues of the Iranian state budget.

The head of the Pentagon, Pete Hegseth, stated that the American navy is able to maintain it "indefinitely" by rotating ships. "We can hold the blockade for as long as it takes. The US Navy can maintain such a blockade indefinitely, as we will rotate ships, as we have done and will continue to do," he said.

The result is already there: in August, Iranian oil supplies to China decreased to about 534,000 barrels per day from 823,000 in July. For comparison, in February they reached 1.58 million barrels. According to Reuters, food prices in Iran rose by about 128% year-on-year in July. At the same time, the national currency continues to fall in price — the exchange rate of the rial in the unregulated market for the first time exceeded 2 million per dollar.

Most of Iran's oil goes by sea. About 90% of exports traditionally pass through the terminals of Kharq Island in the Persian Gulf. Then the tankers need to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, enter the Gulf of Oman and move through the Indian Ocean towards Asia. The main buyer is China, which accounts for more than 80% of Iran's maritime exports.

Moreover, this flow is not limited to Iranian tankers alone. In parallel, Tehran uses the so-called "shadow fleet." To circumvent sanctions, fuel is often reloaded from one vessel, after which it can be designated in documents as Malaysian or Indonesian.

Currently, there are at least 20 warships off the coast of Iran, according to the information service of the US Naval Institute. There are two American aircraft carrier groups in the Arabian Sea, led by the USS George Washington and the USS George H.W. Bush. The USS Boxer landing group and several separately deployed destroyers are also operating there. Since the resumption of the naval blockade of Iran, the US Navy has intercepted 70 merchant ships that were heading to or leaving the Iranian port, the Central Command of the US Armed Forces in the Middle East reported.

Piracy by law

Experts interviewed by Izvestia doubt that the return of the "prize right" will allow the United States to earn significant sums from Iranian oil. At the same time, even a few demonstrative seizures can significantly complicate Tehran's exports and hit the entire shipping market.

Anatoly Kuznetsov, editor-in-chief of the Russian Maritime News publishing house, recalls that such standards appeared during the time of Britain's domination of the sea. According to him, the leading maritime power was actually trying to legally formalize the right to seize other people's ships and cargo.

— Then Britain lived under the slogan "Rule, Britain!". She was the strongest maritime power and in many ways she invented and prescribed the rules herself. In fact, it was an attempt to legitimize robbery, elementary piracy," he believes.

The expert doubts that the norms that were used two centuries ago will be able to be easily transferred to modern times. According to him, US President Donald Trump is trying to "pull out a moth-eaten maritime law doublet from a chest that has rotted from time to time and put it on today."

— It is simply not suitable for use in the current realities. Trump wants to find a legal justification for the legality so that he can stop tankers, pick up their cargoes, sell ships and say: "And I do everything according to the law of the 19th century." But, you know, the 21st century is not the 19th," says Kuznetsov.

A separate problem is related to tankers flying the flags of third countries. According to Kuznetsov, it is necessary to separate the ship itself and the cargo on it: they may belong to different owners and be under different jurisdictions. Therefore, the US attempt to take the oil it carries along with the tanker will inevitably cause additional disputes.

Evgeny Shatov, a partner at Capital Lab, believes that Washington is technically capable of confiscating individual vessels, primarily those related to the Iranian state, sanctions schemes, or violations of the blockade. However, it is almost impossible to earn enough in this way to cover the costs of the war.

One large tanker of the VLCC class carries about 2 million barrels of oil. At a price of $80 per barrel, the value of the cargo is approximately $160 million, even before the costs of storage, transportation, litigation and subsequent sale. To get at least $10 billion in gross revenue, the Americans would have to confiscate about 60-70 such cargoes.

— This would no longer be a targeted sanctions measure, but in fact a large-scale naval campaign with much greater military and political costs. Therefore, the economic sense here is secondary. The main task is to make Iranian exports much more expensive and riskier," Shatov explained.

Moreover, it is not necessary for the United States to seize dozens of tankers for this. The very risk of losing a ship worth tens of millions of dollars may force carriers to abandon work with Iran or significantly raise prices. Freight and insurance costs will rise, and buyers will demand additional risk discounts from Tehran. As a result, Iran will be able to receive less money even while maintaining the same export volumes.

But such a calculation also carries risks for the global market. If seizures become regular, Tehran may respond by detaining merchant vessels, threatening shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, or other asymmetric measures.

— A measure that should reduce Iran's revenues is capable of raising world oil prices again. Therefore, the United States is likely to use the new mechanism selectively: actively enough to scare carriers, but not so widely as to destabilize Hormuz and the global energy market again," Shatov concluded.