How much will an undeclared naval blockade cost Ukraine? Analysis
The main thing in the material:
• Since July 23, traffic along the Ukrainian sea corridor has actually been stopped, although the ports of Odessa, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny remain formally open.
• The ports of Greater Odessa account for about 80% of Ukraine's maritime cargo turnover: in the first half of 2026, 34 million out of 42.4 million tons of cargo passed through them. Alternative routes do not fully compensate for the loss of capacity and are more expensive.
• The NBU estimates the lost export revenue in the second half of the year at $2.5 billion
• The restrictions are already affecting the industry: Ferrexpo has suspended the work of the Poltava GOK, Yuzhny GOK has reduced production due to the accumulation of non-exported iron ore shipments
• Import is also affected by the problems: container shipments are redirected through Constanta and overland routes, which increases the time and cost of transportation
• The macroeconomic impact will be delayed: first, corporate revenue decreases, then tax revenues, and with a simultaneous reduction in external assistance, the risk of pressure on the hryvnia, inflation, and the budget increases.
Until recently, Ukrainian ports remained the country's main operating export channel. However, after a series of attacks by the Russian Armed Forces on infrastructure and ships in July (according to the Russian Defense Ministry, all targets were related to the Armed Forces), international operators refused flights to the ports of Greater Odessa. At the end of July, traffic in the Black Sea corridor stopped, although the ports themselves remain formally open. No legal blockade was declared, but the route stopped working because the private market refused to accept the new level of risk. How much does Ukraine lose due to the disruption of maritime logistics and can a local crisis turn into a catastrophe for the whole country?
The system did not collapse, but it lost the main link.
In the first half of 2026, Ukrainian seaports handled 42.4 million tons of cargo. Moreover, approximately 80% of them (34 million tons) came from the ports of Greater Odessa — Odessa, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny. From these ports, ships travel along the Ukrainian sea corridor towards the Bosphorus, and then to the markets of the Mediterranean and other regions. The corridor was created after the termination of the grain deal (involving Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the United Nations) in the summer of 2023. In three years, 208 million tons of cargo passed through it, including about 120 million tons of grain.
Ukraine does not have its own large merchant marine fleet capable of exporting bulk cargoes. Most of the vessels plying the sea corridor are foreign. Therefore, the operation of the route depends not only on the state of the port infrastructure, but also on the decisions of all participants in the transportation.
At the moment, no alternative route existing in Ukraine can provide transportation volumes comparable to the ports of Greater Odessa: about 3.5–4 million tons of agricultural products were exported through them every month. 2.5 million tons can be exported by rail and through the Danube ports. With improved river navigation, which is currently suffering due to low water levels, alternative logistics will be able to transport about 3.5 million tons per month. However, using such routes will be significantly more expensive.
Thus, the cost of transporting goods by barge from the Ukrainian Danube ports to the Romanian Constanta has almost doubled since the beginning of July and amounts to about $28 per 1 ton. At the same time, due to shallow water, barges lose from 30 to 60% of their carrying capacity, which additionally increases the cost of transporting each ton of cargo.
The difference in the efficiency of sea and land logistics is especially noticeable when transporting bulk goods. One large bulk carrier is capable of transporting 60-70 thousand tons of grain or iron ore per flight. When switching to the railway, this volume has to be distributed among hundreds of wagons, overloaded at the border due to different track widths, and then delivered to the buyer. Automotive logistics is even less efficient: more than 2,000 trucks will be needed to transport the same amount of cargo. As a result, overland routes can save some of the supplies, but increase transportation costs and reduce export profitability. For products with a relatively low cost per ton, logistics is beginning to determine competitiveness no less than the cost of production.
At the same time, changes in supply chains and the increased use of motor vehicles for grain transportation have become one of the factors that led to an increase in demand for diesel fuel. As a result, an atypical situation has developed in the market: wholesale prices exceeded retail prices, which is why farmers began to buy diesel directly at gas stations. At the end of July, wholesale prices reached 90-98 UAH per liter, while at some gas stations diesel could still be purchased for 85-86 UAH. Experts do not rule out further price increases, noting that the consequences of logistics restructuring are superimposed on the rise in oil prices due to ongoing tensions in the Middle East.
According to the State Customs Service of Ukraine, in the first half of 2026, the country exported goods worth about $21 billion. At the same time, exports remain highly concentrated. Food products accounted for $12.5 billion, or almost 60% of the total export revenue. Another $2.2 billion was provided by metals and products made from them.
According to one of the Ukrainian publications, every day of the actual naval blockade leads to a loss of Ukraine of $ 70 million in export revenue. The calculations are based on June statistics: goods worth $2.1 billion were shipped through Odessa, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny in the first summer month, while Ukraine's total monthly commodity exports were about $3.5 billion. In other words, the three ports provided about 60% of the country's export revenue for the month. However, the estimate of $70 million cannot be mechanically multiplied by the number of days of shutdown and declared actual damage. A significant part of the cargo can be removed after the restoration of navigation or redirected to alternative routes. This is exactly what the National Bank of Ukraine draws attention to, giving a more conservative assessment. According to NBU Governor Andriy Pyshny, due to restrictions on maritime logistics, the country may lose about $2.5 billion in export revenue in the second half of 2026. At the same time, the regulator expects that the stuck cargoes will be shipped in the first half of 2027. The total losses will depend on the duration of the disruptions, as well as on what proportion of supplies will be completely disrupted.
If the shipowners consider the route acceptable again, even with increased insurance tariffs, exports will gradually recover. If carriers continue to avoid entering Ukrainian ports, the consequences will quickly go far beyond logistics. The problem will become complex, affecting the industrial, monetary and budgetary spheres.
Exports are declining, and dependence on external aid is growing
According to official data, Ukraine's imports are twice as large as its exports. The negative balance of foreign trade in the first half of the year amounted to $28.3 billion. Such indicators could indicate a currency crisis, but trade in goods is only one part of the balance of payments. The currency also enters the country through the export of services, transfers, international grants and loans. External revenues are now playing a key role in maintaining Ukraine's financial stability. The funds allocated by the European Union, the United States, and the IMF allow the government to finance expenses, and the National Bank to maintain the stability of the foreign exchange market. As of July 1, the NBU's international reserves amounted to $51.3 billion.
This means that the current model of the Ukrainian economy relies on two main sources of currency — its own export earnings and external financing. As long as both flows are maintained, the system is able to function even with deep foreign trade deficits. Therefore, stopping shipping does not in itself mean an immediate economic collapse.
The restriction of shipping in the ports of Greater Odessa does not mean the cessation of Ukrainian imports. According to the European Commission, about 70% of Ukrainian imports came by roads, railways and inland waterways, about 30% through the Black Sea.
However, if a country loses one of the main sources of foreign exchange earnings generated within the state, and imports remain high, then the gap between the demand for foreign currency and its receipt from exporters widens. At the first stage, this gap can be closed through external financing and more active interventions by the National Bank. Therefore, stopping some of the maritime exports will not necessarily lead to a sharp drop in the hryvnia or an immediate budget crisis. International reserves, although they allow the NBU to smooth out the imbalance in the foreign exchange market, cannot serve as a long-term substitute for export earnings. With a steady decline in export revenues and continued high demand for foreign currency, the need for foreign exchange interventions will increase, which increases the country's dependence on external revenues. In turn, international financial assistance helps to maintain the budget and replenish reserves, but it does not compensate for the decline in income of export-oriented enterprises. For them, foreign exchange earnings remain the main source of financing for current activities.
Therefore, a prolonged restriction on maritime exports will initially hit not the state budget, but business. Companies will face an increase in inventory and lack of money to continue production. Then they will begin to reduce investments, purchases and capacity utilization. Only after that, the consequences will fully manifest themselves in a reduction in tax revenues, a decrease in employment and other macroeconomic indicators.
The first effects are already showing up in industry. Ferrexpo mining company (headquartered in Switzerland), which owns production assets in Ukraine, announced the impossibility of further sea exports of products and the suspension of the Poltava Mining and Processing Plant.
The most dangerous scenario will arise if a prolonged decline in exports coincides with a decrease or delay in international financing. In this case, the crisis will begin to escalate. As the compensating mechanisms are exhausted, pressure on the hryvnia will increase, the cost of imported products will increase, and inflation will accelerate (the National Bank of Ukraine raised its inflation forecast for the end of the year to 10% on July 30), and the state will have to spend reserves more actively, reduce costs, or seek new sources of external financing. This becomes especially sensitive in conditions of deep budget deficits. After the revision of the budget law, treasury revenues for 2026 were increased to about UAH 5.2 trillion (almost all of the increase was provided by EU financial assistance), and expenditures to UAH 6.4 trillion. The planned gap is UAH 1.2 trillion. Under these conditions, interruptions in maritime supplies are becoming an additional factor of pressure on the budget, as the state's own revenues are declining at a time when high levels of spending remain.
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