Armenia faced a choice between Russia and the European Union. What does this mean?
Armenia is trying to maneuver in its foreign policy, combining a course towards integration with Europe and participation in Eurasian structures. However, Yerevan is approaching the moment when it will have to make a final choice. In recent weeks, tensions with Russia have been growing: Moscow has imposed import restrictions on some Armenian goods. They also recalled that upon leaving the EAEU, Yerevan will lose its energy benefits. At the same time, Armenia is holding a joint summit with the EU. At the same time, both sides declare their desire to resolve the disputed issues. Who will be superfluous in the Moscow–Yerevan–Brussels triangle, in the Izvestia article.
Finding a way
• Tension has recently arisen in relations between Russia and Armenia due to the desire of the government of the Transcaucasian republic to get closer to the EU: in particular, Yerevan is discussing the introduction of a visa-free regime with the union over the next two years. Armenia has also launched a railway route to the EU via Georgia and Turkey. Moscow criticizes this course and believes that Western countries are trying to set Yerevan against Russia. At the same time, Armenia wants to preserve the advantages of participating in the EAEU, in particular, free trade with the Russian Federation and favorable prices for Russian energy resources.
• There are also political forces in Armenia that support the Russian vector of development and the country's further participation in integration processes involving Russia, in particular the EAEU. Moscow continues its dialogue with Yerevan and treats such sentiments positively. Armenia also knows that preferential prices for Russian energy resources are impossible for countries participating in integrations outside the EAEU.
• Russia has already imposed restrictions on the import of a number of Armenian goods: first, the Rosselkhoznadzor banned the supply of flowers from Armenia, then began inspections of vegetables and fruits, stating problems with product quality and the need for additional security guarantees. At the same time, from May to November 2025, Armenia exported more than €40 million worth of fruits to Russia, and more than €50 million worth of vegetables. Rospotrebnadzor also banned the sale of Jermuk mineral water, cognacs and wines from three Armenian producers — Vedi-Alko, Abovyan Brandy Factory and Shahnazaryan Wine and Cognac House.
• However, Armenia is counting on a settlement of the situation: Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said that similar problems had arisen before with the export of apricots, wine and vodka, and expressed confidence that the parties would be able to find a solution "in a constructive atmosphere."
• Yerevan's relations with Moscow deteriorated shortly after the victory of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's Civil Contract party in the 2021 elections. At that time, Pashinyan spoke about the development of cooperation with the CSTO and the EAEU. However, the authorities soon began discussing rapprochement with the European Union and reconsidering participation in previous associations. In 2024, Armenia froze its participation in the CSTO and stopped financing the organization. At the same time, Yerevan expressed its desire to maintain working relations with Moscow and confirmed that the Russian 102nd base in Gyumri will continue to operate.
Russia's 102nd military base has been located in Gyumri and Yerevan since 1995. This facility plays an important role in the structure of the Russian Armed Forces, fulfilling the tasks of protecting Armenia, as well as controlling the external borders of the CIS within the framework of the agreement valid until 2044.
• There is no clear support for one foreign policy course in Armenia itself. The local population is aware of the importance of cooperation with both Russia and the West. According to the IRI survey, Armenians identify Russia (43%) and the United States (42%) as their key foreign policy partners. At the same time, if a referendum on joining the EU is held in Armenia, 51% of Armenian citizens are ready to vote for, 13% will oppose, and about a third are undecided.
• The ruling party of Armenia retains its leadership, but the level of support is about 25%. At the same time, about half of the voters remain undecided. In such circumstances, topics related to relations between Armenia and the Russian Federation, as well as withdrawal from the CSTO and the EAEU, become an instrument of tug-of-war among the electorate. Among critics of Pashinyan's policy, there are concerns about the reliability of the EU and the possible negative reaction from Moscow due to the rapprochement between Yerevan and Brussels.
• Armenia is trying to maintain a balance between Russia and the European Union, while counting on the benefits of cooperation with both sides. However, as Yerevan's contacts with the EU deepen, the contradictions with Moscow become more noticeable and already affect the trade and economic sphere. At the same time, there is no consensus within Armenia on its foreign policy course, and the authorities are forced to take into account both public sentiment and economic dependence on the Russian Federation. As a result, Yerevan is approaching the moment when it may have to define its foreign policy priorities more clearly.
Economic disputes
• Moscow and Yerevan have a lot in common. Russia accounts for about 20% of Armenia's foreign trade. There is a Russian military base and a joint security system operating in the country. About 2.5 million Armenians live in Russia.
• Losses in mutual trade between Russia and Armenia in 2025 amounted to about $5.1 billion. The trade turnover, which amounted to $11.5 billion in 2024, according to preliminary data, decreased to $6.4 billion in 2025. As explained in the Cabinet of Ministers of the Russian Federation, it was "talk about rapprochement with the EU" that negatively affected the attitude of Russian entrepreneurs to trade with Armenia.
• The Armenian side does not exclude the possibility of launching an exit procedure from the CSTO and the EAEU in the event of an increase in the price of Russian gas. Yerevan receives fuel at a discounted price of $177.5 per thousand cubic meters of gas, while in Europe it exceeds $600. Alternative supplies from Iran cover only 15% of consumption, and due to the conflict over Iran and the closure of the southern route (which provided about 25% of foreign trade), Armenia's dependence on Russia is increasing.
On April 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Pashinyan in Moscow. Putin pointed out that the Russian Federation is calm about the discussion in Armenia on the development of relations with the European Union and understands that any state seeks maximum benefits from cooperation with third countries.
• In addition to gas prices, the railroad has become a sticking point. On February 13, 2026, Yerevan offered Moscow to transfer the railway concession to another country friendly to Russia. So, Kazakhstan, the UAE and Qatar were among the options. According to Pashinyan, this is not directed against Russia, but the current model reduces Armenia's competitiveness. The Russian Foreign Ministry, in turn, recalled that a possible change of operator could have consequences, since the company had been ensuring the network's operability for many years.
The agreement between Armenia and Russian Railways was signed on February 13, 2008: management was transferred for 30 years with the possibility of extension for another 10 years after the first 20 years.
• Russia has repeatedly reminded Armenia of the benefits of participating in the EAEU, in particular, preferential energy supplies and the scale of the bilateral market. Armenia, in turn, shows that it is ready to raise the stakes and consider membership in Eurasian structures as a subject of political bargaining.
What does this mean?
• Despite political differences, Russia remains Armenia's key economic and strategic partner. At the same time, discussions about Yerevan's possible rapprochement with the EU are already affecting bilateral trade and increasing tensions between the two countries. Armenia's high dependence on Russian energy resources and infrastructure significantly limits the possibilities for a drastic change of course.
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