Mali — about protection: will the country's authorities be able to contain the onslaught of terrorists

The situation in Mali is escalating due to attempts by jihadists and separatists to seize power. As a result, government forces suffered serious losses: among the dead were the country's Defense Minister Sadio Camara and the head of national intelligence Modibo Kona. The central government claims that the rebels received funding and support from abroad and are aimed at destabilizing the republic "according to the Syrian scenario." However, despite the similarity of some introductory statements, the situation in Mali remains difficult but under control, and a literal repeat of the Syrian crisis in these places is unlikely, experts interviewed by Izvestia believe.

Where are the main battles going?

Due to the specifics of the fighting, there is still no stable front line in Mali. Control zones are fixed either around large settlements or at permanent transport arteries, while a significant part of the territories is only under the "conditional control" of the warring parties or is used by them for maneuvers.

Today, the most difficult situation is observed on the border with Algeria — most of the Kidal and Timbuktu districts are controlled by the Azawad Liberation Front, along the border of Mali with Mauritania, militants from Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam Wal Muslimin (both groups, FLA and JNIM, are associated with Al-Qaeda (a terrorist organization banned in Russia).

At the same time, the administrative regions of Kulikoro and Kayes, adjacent to Mauritania from the south, remain predominantly under the control of government forces. The capital of the country and its surroundings, despite periodic attacks by armed groups, remain under the strict control of the security forces. The situation in Bamako, according to the latest reports from Russian Ambassador Igor Gromyko, is calm.

The administrative region of Gao, bordering Niger, has also become the subject of intense struggle between the Government and the opposition. However, in addition to them, supporters of the Islamic State in the Sahel province (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation) joined the "division". Their presence was noted, in particular, in Labbezang, on the border of Mali and Niger, as well as in Menaka. The radicals themselves claim that they were able to take control of up to 40% of the Gao region.

Interestingly, the activation of supporters of the Islamic State (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation) occurred in the same areas that JNIM representatives had previously claimed control over. Given the strained relations between the two groups, the formation of a tactical alliance between them (as previously between JNIM and FLA) is unlikely. Quite the opposite: competing radicals are trying to create "enclaves" in the already cleared territories in order to use them to their advantage.

As Grigory Lukyanov, Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences, researcher at the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, noted in an interview with Izvestia, the desert regions of northern Mali create enormous opportunities for maneuver, which the opponents of Bamako took advantage of.

— Having stopped offensive operations in the north and thus lost to a certain extent the initiative, the government forces today faced the fact that the forces of armed radicals, terrorist groups and separatists relied on a maneuverable war. They are actively moving, transferring forces across the borders of Mali with neighboring states, replenishing resources at the expense of the poor nomadic and semi—nomadic population in the north of the country and at the expense of the population of neighboring states," the expert noted.

According to him, relying on mobile groups allows radicals to evade the means of surveillance and reconnaissance available to government forces, including drones and manned aircraft, to concentrate forces for strikes at the last moment and thereby use the surprise factor.

Are neighboring countries helping Mali

The members of the Sahel Troika (the confederation of Sahel States, which, in addition to Mali, includes Niger and Burkina Faso) reacted rather cautiously to the destabilization of their neighbor.

On the second day after the offensive of the opposition forces in Mali, a mass mobilization was announced in Burkina Faso, thereby accelerating the fusion of the pro-government militia with regular troops. Niger has not conducted any additional defense preparations, but this is more likely due to the fact that the country has been living in a general mobilization mode since December 2025, and the army is ready for relatively rapid deployment (at least on paper).

Niamey and Ouagadougou did not send any help to their neighbor. Their resources are mostly focused on containing the armed underground on their own territory and preventing the opening of a "second front" in the areas adjacent to Mali, which can generally be regarded as feasible assistance to their confederate comrades. At the same time, the question of the Sahel Troika's readiness for such challenges (and the effectiveness of the military and political reforms carried out by the new authorities) is still open.

Political scientist Dastan Tokoldoshev also drew attention to the fact that, in addition to external reasons limiting the participation of Burkina Faso and Niger in the conflict, there are also implicit internal ones.

— There is a fairly large Tuareg community in Niger, which partly prevents Niamey from "tightening the screws" and conducting operations against the FLA in conjunction with the Malian army. Even taking into account the general marginalization of this group, the country's authorities prefer to keep a balance of interests and not give opponents a reason for additional consolidation," he believes.

Why it's important to monitor France's actions

The crisis in Mali is playing into the hands of the EU countries, which have weakened their positions in the region after a surge of anti-Western sentiment in Africa. Therefore, the Europeans may not be financing the rebels directly, but they are creating the necessary background to discredit the government camp of Mali in the eyes of the world majority.

France, which until recently played a leading role in countering terrorism in Africa, is the most diligent of the others. The Elysee Palace is eager to take revenge on the continent and is looking for any ways to show the failure of "alternative security architectures." The JNIM and FLA offensive gives Paris the opportunity not only to recall the past successes of Operation Barkhan, but also to provide a favorable contrast with those countries where the presence of the French contingent remains, for example, with Benin and Nigeria. European publications and bloggers are actively replicating the news about the withdrawal of the Afrika Korps of the Russian Defense Ministry from Kidal, positioning this as one of the signs of the approaching collapse of the system. In fact, Paris is once again trying to wishful thinking.

Although it is worth noting that the Afrika Korps of the Russian Defense Ministry repelled all militant attacks, but suffered losses, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Borisenko said at a meeting of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs. The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed the withdrawal of the Afrika Korps from the city of Kidal and stressed that its units "continue to carry out their tasks and are ready to repel militant attacks."

Maxim Solopov, deputy editor-in-chief of the African Initiative, head of the Bamako office, noted that the decision to withdraw the Afrika Korps forces from Kidal was forced, but rational. According to him, the city is located deep in the desert zone at a considerable distance (more than 1,000 km) from the main centers of the country, which makes its retention extremely difficult from the point of view of logistics and supply.

— Despite numerous videos of terrorists in various localities, there is no information about the defeat of any large units, violation of the command and control system or disorganization of defense in the entire theater of operations. The withdrawal was organized with the withdrawal of equipment and evacuation of the wounded, and did not represent a chaotic retreat," Maxim Solopov shared with Izvestia.

He added: the armed formations are heterogeneous and include elements of different nature and motivation, from radical Islamists to ethnic and criminal structures.

The expert noted that the country's armed forces and the fighters of the Afrika Korps are capable of inflicting heavy military losses on the militants, but the conflict also has a social and political dimension. Its settlement requires a subtle and balanced approach to its participants. In Mali, there is already a practice of involving former militants in reintegration processes, including adaptation programs and the inclusion of individual members of armed groups in government structures and armed forces. According to him, this work is underway, but it is complicated, among other things, by the sanctions and economic pressure on Mali from the West.

Is a Syrian scenario possible in Mali

The swift rush by Bamako's opponents has revived the debate about the resilience of the Malian authorities. Parallels are drawn, among other things, with the Syrian crisis of 2024, when the armed opposition managed in a short time not only to destabilize the front, but also to completely paralyze the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

However, the main difference between the two crises is that the Malian army remains operational and manageable. An important role in this is played by the presence of the Afrika Korps, which, although it suffers losses in clashes with militants, ensures the stability of the zone of control of government forces and inflicts painful blows to the militants. In addition, the country's leader Assimi Goita, despite rumors of flight, remains in Bamako and leads counter-operations.

As Grigory Lukyanov pointed out, the "Syrian scenario" should be interpreted not only from the perspective of the fall of the old regime, but also as the collapse of an outdated political system. And with this reading, the Malian events do not fit into the specified framework.

— The current government in Mali does not have such a long period of degradation and delegitimization of the system in the eyes of the population as in Syria. There is no discrediting of the political elite here, as it was in Syria in 2024," he said.

Despite the death of the Minister of Defense and the head of the national intelligence service, which dealt a serious blow to the authorities, in general, the military and political leadership continues to enjoy quite serious support from the country's population, including its young part, the expert added.

According to him, the authorities manage to maintain public political support. And this gives stability to the Malian system even in the face of serious structural problems — unlike opponents, whose reputation outside the northern provinces is ambiguous, Lukyanov is sure.

Therefore, an opposition march on Bamako is unlikely today. However, this poses another, more serious threat. Instead of knocking government forces out of the capital, the armed opposition is likely to rely on the slow strangulation of the ruling elites by cutting logistics chains and intercepting goods (including civilian ones), as well as pinpoint strikes against garrisons and government facilities. Such tactics can provoke accelerated deterioration of the system from the inside and create conditions for new coups in Mali. Opponents of the Assimilation government will probably not fail to take advantage of this.