​​​​​​​How the United States and Iran are capitalizing on the crisis. Analysis

The main thing in the material:

— The United States has imposed a naval blockade of Iranian ports, turning Hormuz into a manageable risk zone

— Washington earns not from the conflict itself, but from rising energy prices and increased supplies.

— Iran, despite the pressure, maintains exports and continues to earn income. Under the blockade, Tehran relies on shadow logistics and floating stocks.

After the failure of negotiations with Tehran, the United States imposed a naval blockade of Iranian ports, turning the Strait of Hormuz into a manageable risk zone. Since the beginning of the war, oil prices have risen by 40%, energy supplies have not recovered, and access to the route has become a commodity. In this construction, the United States makes money from control, redistribution of flows and rising energy prices, while Iran makes money from shortages and controlled instability. Details can be found in the Izvestia article.

How Washington is monetizing the conflict

On Monday, April 13, the United States began a naval blockade of Iranian ports in the Persian and Oman Gulfs: the Navy threatened to detain ships that are somehow connected with Iran. At the same time, the passage between non-Iranian ports is formally preserved. The navy was also ordered to intercept any ships in international waters that paid Tehran for passage through Hormuz. More than 15 American warships are deployed to support the operation.

In practice, the American blockade scheme does not look like a "lock" on all maritime traffic, but as a force filter for Iranian maritime trade. So far, no ships have been reported seized: most shipowners contacted by Bloomberg in the Middle East and Asia said they would not enter the strait until the situation was clarified. However, it is known that in the first 48 hours of the blockade, the US military forced nine ships to turn around. In total, about two dozen commercial vessels have passed through the Strait of Hormuz during this time, and some of them are presumably associated with the Iranian "shadow" fleet. This suggests that the "tightness" of the blockade is questionable, despite Washington's assurances.

So far, the United States is making money not on total force control, but on the fact that this control changes the price of the route. We are not talking about a formal tariff, which is officially charged for passage, but about the total cost of the shipowner: insurance, freight, risk premium, which has increased many times during the crisis. The marine insurance market itself is concentrated in the Western system — that's where the money settles. At the same time, the United States recently announced a doubling of financial guarantees for ships passing through Hormuz to $40 billion. This means that the United States assumes part of the insurance risks in the conflict zone. As a result, a closed model is emerging: the United States, through guarantees, supports the operation of the route, and indirectly earns its cost through the insurance infrastructure.

However, the key gain lies not in the plane of risks, but in the basic commodity — oil, whose exports are becoming more expensive with the crisis. In the last week of February, that is, before the outbreak of the war, the United States exported 11 million barrels per day of oil and petroleum products, of which almost 4 million barrels were crude oil. In late March and early April, total exports increased by 700,000 barrels, while oil supplies increased by about 150,000 barrels per day. This does not look like an explosive leap (we have already written that the United States does not have the ability to quickly replace supplies from the Persian Gulf). However, demand has increased significantly: according to Kpler, 70 supertankers are expected to arrive in the ports of the Gulf of Mexico in April and May. Last year, an average of 27 supertankers per month were loaded there. Each vessel can carry about 2 million barrels of oil over long distances, for example, from Houston to Singapore.

Considering that before the outbreak of hostilities, Brent crude oil cost about $70 per barrel, and in March the average price approached $104, the United States earned an additional $137 million per day on exports alone. That is, the war brought the United States, first of all, a price gain, not an export boom. However, Kpler believes that crude oil exports from the United States may reach a record 5 million barrels per day this month, and a new record may be set in May based on the current volume of tanker shipments.

The US gas market is already receiving additional revenue through two channels: through rising prices and LNG supplies. Exports increased from about 9.9 million tons in February to 11.7 million tons in March (the plants were operating above their design capacity, and new installations were also commissioned). Although Europe remains the largest buyer of American LNG, shipments to Asia more than doubled in March compared with February, to 2 million tons. At the same time, gas prices in Europe accelerated from $400 in February to $500-600 per thousand cubic meters in March. As a result, U.S. revenue grew from about $5.5 billion to $8-9.5 billion per month.

What benefits did Iran benefit from

The purpose of the American blockade of Iranian ports is to maximize pressure on the Islamic Republic by cutting off its cash flows from energy trade. On the eve of the conflict, many experts did not believe that Tehran would close the Strait of Hormuz, as its exports would suffer. However, Iran managed to keep oil supplies on the market, in particular, due to the fact that Washington temporarily eased sanctions, allowing the sale of oil loaded on tankers in order to bring down prices. Vortexa estimates that Iran shipped 1.8 million barrels per day in March. In February, exports were higher — almost 2.2 million barrels. The average volume of exports over the past two months has exceeded the level of 2025 by 26% (shipments mainly went to China). Due to the fact that the cost of energy resources has increased, Iran has managed to increase revenue. Bloomberg estimates indicate that before the war, the country earned about $100 million per day from oil sales. Since February 27, this amount has increased to about $175 million.

One of the main tools of Iran's resilience is a "shadow" fleet with hundreds of vessels that turn off transponders, transmit false location data, and change names, flags, and owners. The costs of the state under sanctions are higher, there are more intermediaries, but at prices of $90-100, this scheme is still effective.

In addition, Iran has created oil reserves on the water outside the Strait of Hormuz — their volume can reach 190 million barrels. It is estimated that this could help Iran and Chinese importers survive the blockade for weeks or even months. Significant accumulations of floating storage facilities have been recorded in the Yellow and South China Seas. Even if the accumulated volume is sold at a discount, we are talking about a reserve of liquidity at the level of $ 15-17 billion.

In such a situation, Iran can turn the deficit into income, albeit through a gray channel. In addition, he sells passage security as a separate service. Sources say Iran levies duties on ships passing through the strait and grants preferences to countries it considers friendly.

At the same time, Iran is trying to regain access to previously frozen assets. In the context of the negotiations between the United States and Iran, the issue of unblocking $6 billion held in Qatar was probably discussed. For Tehran, frozen assets are another product of the crisis. This is a potential source of liquidity at a time when maritime exports are under pressure. In total, experts estimate the total amount of frozen Iranian assets abroad at more than $100 billion.

What will happen if the blockade drags on?

The United States is capitalizing on the crisis as a systemic beneficiary. They sell more expensive oil and LNG, enhance the political value of their supplies, control a significant part of the insurance and financial infrastructure, and benefit from market volatility. Iran earns money differently: it cannot dominate in terms of scale, but it knows how to sell oil even in a reduced mode. America is monetizing control, Iran is monetizing chaos.

However, if the confrontation drags on, the blockade could seriously harm both the Iranian and American economies. At the same time, the United States believes that they are better prepared for these shocks. However, a prolonged blockade and escalation of the conflict may lead to a new increase in oil prices, which means gasoline will become even more expensive for Americans. The 2 million barrels that Iran exported during the conflict account for about 2% of global demand — not much, however, against the background of a sharp drop in supplies from the Persian Gulf countries, it is still sensitive for the market.

In fact, the United States and Iran are currently playing a game of "who blinks first". The Islamic Republic has repeatedly been under the burden of heavy international sanctions that have seriously affected its economy, but it has been able to withstand them. Analysts believe that it is hardly possible to block the supply of all Iranian oil, especially given the reserves on the water.

The main danger of the blockade for Iran is related to the fact that the lion's share of oil is exported by sea. The actual capacity of the only Iranian pipeline that goes to the Gulf of Oman is about 200,000 barrels per day, while the US Navy may try to take control of this route.

In addition, if the American blockade is not lifted in the coming weeks, Tehran will have to start conserving oil wells due to the filling of storage facilities. And it is still unclear whether this factor will become a lever that will force the Islamic Republic to soften its negotiating position. There are no such signs now.