Moldova's approach to the return of Transnistria has changed. What you need to know
Chisinau has presented a new plan for the reintegration of Transnistria. This is an informal document focused on the EU and does not contain a clear strategy or timeline. It rejects the idea of a special status for the region, relies on international pressure and gradual integration through the economy and external partners. However, the implementation of these ideas is complicated by the lack of resources and the unstable energy situation in Europe. What you need to know about Kishenev's new views on the region is in the Izvestia article.
A new attempt at integration
• The 14-page plan for Transnistria prepared by Chisinau, presented in March 2026, is preliminary and informal. The text is actually addressed to a Western audience: it exists only in English and has not been widely discussed within the country, nor has it been submitted to the OSCE, whose mission has been operating in Moldova since 1993.
• The approach itself reflects a change in policy towards Transnistria. If Brussels allowed the integration of the region "in parts" until the end of 2025, then after the parliamentary elections and the preservation of power of the pro-European Action and Solidarity party (PAS), more active steps towards a settlement were expected from Chisinau. In response, this plan appeared, or rather, a set of ideas (or, as stated in the document itself, "approaches") with the stated goal of peaceful reintegration. At the same time, without strict deadlines and obligations.
• In terms of content, the project demonstrates a marked departure from previous initiatives. It does not include the topic of the special status of the region. At the same time, it is emphasized that Moldova is the only subject of international law, and Transnistria is its part within recognized borders. Chisinau also effectively excludes Russia from the process, considering it as a source of threat, and suggests seeking the withdrawal of Russian forces from Transnistria through international pressure (we wrote more about how Moldova is severing all ties with Moscow here).
• At the same time, Chisinau relies on external partners. They play a key role both in demilitarization and in the possible replacement of the current peacekeeping operation with a civilian mission. The 5+2 negotiation format has been declared ineffective, while the 1+1 dialogue remains in place, but without expectations of serious results.
The 5+2 format is an international format for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, involving Moldova and Transnistria as parties to the conflict, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as mediators, and the EU and the United States as observers. It was the main negotiating mechanism, but it actually stopped working after 2022.
• Instead, it is proposed to gradually extend Moldovan legislation to the region and introduce a transitional stage with an international administration that will take control before the transfer of powers to Chisinau. It is emphasized separately that the processes of European integration and reintegration will proceed at different rates, which allows for the temporary non-application of EU norms on the left bank.
• In general, the document does not suggest quick solutions. Rather, his main task is to get the EU's reaction and then adjust the course depending on the position of Western partners.
Significance for Russia
• Russia's interests in Transnistria have been shaped since the armed conflict in 1992, after which Russian peacekeeping forces were deployed in the security zone. A peacekeeping contingent and an operational group of Russian troops totaling more than 1,000 people are stationed in Transnistria. Their tasks include ensuring stability on the demarcation line and protecting ammunition depots near the village of Kolbasna, where about 20-22 thousand tons of weapons are concentrated.
• About 200 thousand Russians live in Transnistria. Considering that the total population of the unrecognized republic is about 455 thousand people, Russians make up almost half of the population. The region remains an important element of Russia's foreign policy in Eastern Europe. At the same time, Chisinau's new plan does not take these factors into account. It presupposes the exclusion of Russia from the settlement, the withdrawal of its military and the rejection of the idea of a special status for the region, which contradicts Russian interests.
The European skew
• Moldovan President Maia Sandu is often referred to as a pro-Romanian politician. She has Romanian citizenship, and Chisinau's policy after she came to power is focused solely on integration with the EU, where Romania plays a prominent role. Such a foreign policy course is gradually eroding Moldova's independence.
• In the context of Transnistria, this directly affects the approach to the settlement. Chisinau relies on the EU and departs from the previous format with the participation of Russia, therefore, in the new plan there is neither a special status of the region nor the role of Moscow. This causes wariness in Transnistria itself and complicates the search for a compromise, since the region is traditionally oriented towards Russia.
The gas aspect
• On December 28, 2024, Gazprom stopped supplying gas to Moldova due to the fact that Moldovagaz, despite the contract valid until 2026, systematically failed to fulfill its financial obligations. Since February 2025, fuel has been supplied under a temporary model with the participation of a Hungarian company and intermediaries from the UAE. About 3 million cubic meters were transferred daily through Moldovagaz to Tiraspol.
• However, the situation deteriorated sharply after Iran's attacks on the UAE and Qatar. Due to rising prices, expenses have increased. Previously, €25-30 million was required per month, but now the same amount of gas will cost more. Additional problems were caused by disruptions in the banking system and restrictions on transactions due to attacks on data centers in the Emirates.
• Despite the crisis, supplies are formally continuing. Moldovagaz's contract has been extended until June 30, 2026 (previously valid until March 31). Due to the warm weather, the situation for the population is not very critical right now.
• Chisinau is considering the possibility of accelerated rapprochement with Transnistria against the background of the deteriorating energy situation in Europe. However, the Moldovan authorities do not yet have a clear integration plan.
• Also, the annexation of Transnistria would require huge funds, which Moldova simply does not have. In this regard, it is assumed that part of the costs will have to be shifted to businesses from Transnistria. To this end, a bill has been submitted to the Moldovan parliament providing for the abolition of tax and customs preferences that local enterprises have enjoyed since 2000.
• In general, the situation on the gas market due to the Middle East conflict increases uncertainty around plans for the integration of Transnistria. For example, fuel prices in Europe have sharply reached their highest levels since 2023 due to disruptions in LNG supplies from Qatar and other Persian Gulf countries, as well as increased competition with Asia for limited gas volumes (we wrote more about the energy crisis in Europe here).
• At the same time, reserves in European gas storage facilities remain low — about 30%, which increases the risk of shortage. In such conditions, the energy market becomes extremely sensitive, and any disruptions can put additional pressure on the economies of the continent's countries, including Moldova and Transnistria. All this puts Chisinau's plans for reintegration on the back burner.
The essence of the initiative
• The submitted Chisinau document is a non—binding conceptual outline. This project cannot even be called a roadmap. It only reflects a common vision based on the idea of demilitarization and subsequent integration of the region under the control of the Moldovan authorities. At the same time, it is assumed that after the stabilization and withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent, the administration of the territory will pass to Chisinau.
• The issue of Transnistria has been on the agenda for a long time, and they periodically return to it, trying to find new approaches. However, the current political and economic situation makes the implementation of such plans extremely difficult.
In order to sever the existing ties between Moscow and Transnistria, gradual economic coercion is being relied on, since direct conflict can lead to unpredictable consequences. Pridnestrovian companies, in order to export products to the EU, are forced to work through the Moldovan jurisdiction — to comply with its rules, arrange supplies and pay taxes and fees. About €8 million is already passing through such mechanisms, and about 70% of the region's exports are sent to EU countries. As a result, Transnistria's economy is gradually becoming more dependent on Moldova and the European market.
• A model is being formed in which Transnistria is losing its independence and is increasingly dependent on its neighbors. However, the effectiveness of such a strategy remains an open question, as it may create additional tension. Moldova does not have enough resources, and without the support of the European Union and other external players, it is almost impossible to achieve serious changes. At the same time, the EU has not yet demonstrated its willingness to actively engage in solving the problem.
When writing the material, Izvestia talked and took into account the opinions of:
- Igor Shornikov, former Deputy Foreign Minister of Pridnestrovie, Associate professor at the Financial University under the Government of Russia;
- political scientist Natalia Eliseeva;
- Andrey Koshkin, Doctor of Political Sciences, expert of the Association of Military Political Scientists.
Переведено сервисом «Яндекс Переводчик»
