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- "I consider it necessary to preserve": how did the people speak out for the preservation of the USSR
"I consider it necessary to preserve": how did the people speak out for the preservation of the USSR
On March 17, 1991, the first and only referendum in the history of the USSR was held. The majority of the country's residents supported the preservation of the Union. Alas, this wish was not destined to come true. Izvestia recalled the story.
In the circle of problems
In March 1990, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR repealed Article 6 of the Constitution on the leadership and guiding role of the CPSU. Soon after, the so-called "sovereignty parade" swept through the country. The Baltic states, followed by other republics of the USSR, including Russia, adopted declarations of national sovereignty, in which they tried to assert the priority of republican laws over all-Union ones. Mikhail Gorbachev, who was elected president of the USSR on March 15, 1990, gradually turned into a "king without a kingdom." Party discipline no longer mattered, and the Kremlin could not "restore order" in the republics.
Perestroika began as a series of controlled eases in economic and socio-political life, but after five years of experimentation, the process began to develop unpredictably. The country, which was considered a superpower all over the world, "was dying like an ancient lizard with a new virus in its cells," sang the popular Nautilus Pompilius group at that time.
A rally at the theater building, where the XX Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania was held. December 19-20, 1989
Strangely enough, the Soviet economy in 1987-1990 showed very decent growth rates — 3-6 times higher than, for example, the American ones. The positive dynamics can also be seen in the demographic indicators of those years. It would seem that at the most critical time for the USSR! This shows that for the well-being of society and the stability of the state, not only economic growth is important, but also manageability, accurate operation of the management system and social support. And this system was malfunctioning.
An important factor in the destabilization was the surge in crime, from street hooliganism to corruption in the highest authorities. Another touch is the collapse of the old ideology, which was close and familiar to most citizens of the USSR. Instead of the doctrine of "developed socialism," the society received colorful damning journalism without a clear creative program. "For someone who does not know which pier to dock at, any wind is not fair," said the ancient Roman philosopher Seneca.
A rally on the eve of the referendum on the preservation of the USSR. March 10, 1991
In an atmosphere of anarchy, the country was turning into bankruptcy. To "plug the holes," they had to resort to loans. According to various estimates, the external debt of the USSR increased by 300-500% over the last three years of perestroika...
Responding to the challenges of the crisis, in December 1990, at the IV Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, Gorbachev made a proposal: "I am submitting to the Congress a proposal to hold a referendum throughout the country so that every citizen speaks out for or against the Union of Sovereign States on a federal basis." The relevant resolution stated that the referendum was being held "in connection with numerous appeals from workers expressing concern about the fate of the USSR and taking into account that the preservation of the united Union state is the most important issue of public life, affects the interests of every person, the entire population of the Soviet Union."
President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Nikolai Ryzhkov during the IV Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. December 12, 1990
The very idea of holding such a referendum to a certain extent shook the remnants of Soviet patriotic consciousness. It came from weakness, not from the strength of the political system. Raising the question of the future of the Union implied the possibility of its dissolution. The crazy idea of this seemed blasphemous 3-4 years ago, and now there is a discussion first at the state level, then at the national level... But Gorbachev decided on this risky step in the hope that popular support would strengthen his power and maintain his status as a recognized leader and initiator of perestroika. It was the first and last national referendum in the history of the Soviet Union.
Majority decision
"Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of people of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?" was the only question of the referendum.
A political struggle has developed around this issue. At that time, many republics believed that centralization prevented them from achieving a "European" standard of living. But if we recall who was a universal donor in the Soviet Union, we will see that over the 70-year history of the state, this status has certainly been earned by the Russian Federation and oil-rich Azerbaijan. Belarus was the country's most efficient assembly plant. Good economic prospects (time has shown that they are justified) were emerging in Turkmenistan. The desire for independence that swept Armenia and Georgia was particularly illogical. Here we can rather talk about an attack of blind nationalism based on memories of ancient history.
Islam Karimov and Nursultan Nazarbayev, who led Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan at that time, were ardent supporters of preserving the USSR. They openly supported the Union, and the voters listened to them. However, few people in Central Asia doubted it at that time. Multinational Turkmenistan also voted almost unanimously for the Union.
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev speaks at the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU. The year 1990
In Ukraine, the elite, who dreamed of obtaining the status of officials of the "independent state," opposed the preservation of the Union. The Ukrainian nationalists also actively called for putting an end to the Soviet system. But their influence at that time was small. Residents of the Ukrainian SSR provided about the same support to the Union as voters from the RSFSR. We were even more optimistic about the future of the Union in Belarus.
At that time, the democratic opposition had a powerful influence on the minds, demanding radical reforms from the president. It was believed that the initiator of perestroika in early 1991 took a "conservative turn", which consisted in an attempt to stop the disintegration of the country by force and introduce elements of censorship, which resulted in the prohibition of unauthorized demonstrations and the removal from the air of the popular TV program "Vzglyad". This trend of public thought was well represented in the press and in the councils of people's deputies. At that time, they were increasingly criticizing Gorbachev. The reason for this campaign was the desire to castlepoint the Kremlin. The radicals relied on Boris Yeltsin, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. As a rule, they simply did not think about the consequences of the collapse of the country.
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR Boris Yeltsin during the All-Union referendum on the future of the USSR, surrounded by journalists near the polling station. March 17th, 1991
Yeltsin himself formally supported the preservation of the Union, but at the same time clearly demonstrated his disdain for Gorbachev's referendum initiative. In his speeches in the winter and spring of 1991, he reasoned as follows: "It will be extremely difficult for me personally to give... The unequivocal answer is, although I am in favor of a Union, but one in which the republics unite of their own free will, not by force... The referendum is being held in order to gain support for the current policy of the country's leadership. It is aimed at preserving the imperial, unitary essence of the Union, the system, and allows only outwardly updating it..."It is no coincidence that in Moscow, where support for Yeltsin and the Demoralization was particularly strong, a relatively modest number of 63% voted in support of the USSR. And in Sverdlovsk, the birthplace of Boris Nikolaevich, only 34% of the citizens who came to the plebiscite supported the idea of a renewed Union.
It was not possible to hold a full-fledged vote in the Baltic republics, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova. By that time, the separatist policy had gone too far there, and there was fierce propaganda against the union center. Thus, six of the 15 republics officially refused to comply with the decision of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, which, among other things, was attended by their representatives. The Center tried to dissuade the "rebels," but, as happened in those years, it was not very convincing. The six republics have not changed their decision. But some territories did not obey the decision of the republican governments. In Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and Gagauzia, a referendum was held, and the inhabitants of these formations supported the USSR. The boycott of six small republics could not shake the legitimacy of a large-scale plebiscite. About 2 million residents of these republics took part in the voting: voting rooms were equipped for them on the territory of military units.
At the polling station of the Vilnius garrison on the day of the All-Union referendum on the preservation of the USSR. March 17th, 1991
As a result, of the 185.6 million adult citizens of the USSR who were on the lists, 148.5 million took part in the referendum — about 80%. Of these, 76.43% were in favor of preserving the USSR "as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics." 113.5 million people supported the country, speaking simply and clearly: "We consider it necessary to preserve." It was difficult to ignore this result. Of course, the referendum demonstrated the weighty decision of the majority, which gave the force of law to Gorbachev's possible forceful decisions when it was necessary to protect the "united, mighty Soviet Union." Another thing is that the policy of the President of the USSR has become even more controversial. Perhaps the Kremlin was waiting for even more significant support for the idea of the Union? But many citizens voted against it, disappointed in Mikhail Gorbachev's policies and seeing no prospects in his controversial course.
The answer that was not heard
The USSR Constitution declared the results of the referendum binding. But these are beautiful words, and there was no mechanism for monitoring the fulfillment of the people's will. It turned out that without a well-honed procedure, democracy simply does not work...
As soon as the results of the referendum appeared in the press, the attack of the "leaders of public opinion" on the results of the poll began. "The referendum has passed. And a plebiscite with him," one popular newspaper at that time published under such a cap.
Voting at polling station No. 17 of the Proletarian district of Moscow on the day of the All-Union referendum on the preservation of the USSR. March 17th, 1991
There is a widespread opinion among political scientists, Soviet and foreign, that the question at the referendum was formulated incorrectly: they say, its very wording pushed for the answer "for the USSR." I think this is a stereotype. For the politicized society of that time, the nuances of the wording were not important: everyone understood how and why they saw the future of the country.
And opinion polls confirm that the results of the referendum give an objective picture of public opinion. People opposed the disintegration of the community that had been gathering for centuries, which all the peoples of the USSR defended during the years of unprecedented military trials. It turned out that the popular majority understands the meaning of the country's historical existence much better than analysts, augurs, and political leaders. It is a pity that the majority opinion was not listened to. They asked questions, but they tried not to hear the answer.
Tanks on Red Square in Moscow during the August coup on August 19-22, 1991
What happened next? Negotiations on a new union treaty, in which not all republics participated again. But the renewed state, apparently, could become an amorphous confederation... The idea did not stand the test of the failed coup in August 1991. It could not withstand the new wave of separatism. And when, in December, in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, the presidents of Belarus and Ukraine, contrary to the will of their peoples, said "no" to the Union, Gorbachev had neither the firm desire nor the strength to defend himself and the Soviet Union. The citizens took it with a sense of tired doom. But few people then imagined that this was not a signboard change, but a real divorce with a cut "to the quick".
An unfulfilled dream
Why do we today call the collapse of the USSR a major catastrophe? Not just out of nostalgic feelings. The unity of peoples and territories united by a common destiny — those that were "united forever by great Russia" — is the most important moral and political capital that should be protected.
The brotherhood of nations and the economy were not fictions. The USSR had a potential for development. Both in order to protect sovereignty in any situation, and for a competitive economy. 300 million citizens with a high educational level in a single space is both a sales market and a unique workforce base. But the main thing is a cultural community, a similar value system, and common shrines.
Handing a student a passport of a citizen of the USSR. May 1, 1987
Alas, the apologists of separatism have done a lot to destroy this unity. In many former Soviet republics, the ideology of sovereignty has become based on "cave anti-Sovietism," which easily turns into Russophobia. And these projects are based on historical falsifications. These tools are used by political forces that are not interested in the development of the peoples of the former USSR. For them, Russophobia is a weapon that destroys not only the memory of the past, but also the prospects for development.
Yes, Soviet society proved vulnerable to counter-propaganda, especially during the Cold War. But all of us, both emotionally and through sober analysis, will experience a sense of unfulfilled potential and unfulfilled dreams for a long time to come. We have lost something important, and it is no coincidence that such attempts to "work on mistakes" as the Union State of Russia and Belarus and other successfully functioning integration structures are so important in the post—Soviet space.
Workers' demonstration on Red Square in Moscow on November 7, 1986
The "unfulfilled" referendum was a hard lesson for the peoples of the USSR and, above all, for Russia. It became clear that the integrity of the state, the "tranquility of our borders" is an unshakable value, a shrine. You can discuss the nuances of economic and political life, laws, taxes, but not the prospect of the collapse of what has been going on for centuries. The events of the spring of 1991 showed how dangerous it is when the political initiative in a country is seized by a clear minority, radicals who do not take into account either public opinion or the interests of the state. I would like to believe that a repeat of such a "gambit" is impossible today. Destructive political movements should not influence the fate of the country. The tragic mistake of 1991 helped us to realize this truth more acutely.
The author is the deputy editor—in-chief of the magazine "Historian"
Переведено сервисом «Яндекс Переводчик»
