Failed to save: why the August coup failed

On August 19, 1991, the word "coup" was used around the world in relation to our country. The attempt to save the USSR turned into a failure — and at the end of the three-day political action film, the Indestructible Union finally embarked on the path of disintegration. Izvestia investigated what happened then.

In the seventh year of perestroika, the political system in the Soviet Union changed. From now on, the CPSU did not play the role of a "guiding and guiding" force, and its General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev became president of the USSR. In this status, he was the only Soviet politician to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. Both in America and in Europe, "gorbimania" was raging. The Soviet leader was seen as a hope for the transformation of the world. Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union, reforms have reached an impasse. Having lost the party vertical, the economic system became uncontrollable. The separatists, who were directly funded from abroad, came out of hiding, and corruption reached unprecedented proportions. In one year, President Gorbachev borrowed more from foreign powers than the USSR had borrowed in 70 years of its history. At the same time, it was not even possible to plug the holes: finances simply disappeared into thin air. And since then, debts have become a burden on our economy for a long time.

"Overcome a deep crisis"

The signing of the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States, which was to become a new version of the USSR, was scheduled for August 20. But could a structure that essentially transformed a federation into a confederation become viable? 11 of the 15 Soviet republics were ready to sign this treaty.

But on the morning of August 19th, the situation changed dramatically. Turning on the TV, the Soviet people learned about the creation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKCHP) and the introduction of a state of emergency. It was announced that President Gorbachev was temporarily unable to perform his duties due to illness. Vice President Gennady Yanaev formally became the first person in the country. Besides him, the GKCHP includes all the heads of law enforcement ministries, Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, and major industrial managers.

Gorbachev was vacationing in the Crimea, in the picturesque Foros. The day before, a delegation of future members of the State Emergency Committee visited him. They proposed to Mikhail Sergeyevich to introduce a state of emergency and expressed their readiness to carry out this menial work for him — in the name of preserving the USSR. According to Oleg Baklanov, the curator of the Soviet defense industry, Gorbachev, in his characteristic ambiguous manner, approved of their initiative... Mikhail Sergeyevich himself later, after the failure of the Emergency Committee, categorically denied this.

Millions of eyewitnesses remember how, on the morning of August 19, television broadcast the ballet Swan Lake, interrupting it for informational messages in which the country's leadership invited society to "overcome the deep crisis, political, interethnic and civil confrontation, chaos and anarchy, which threaten people's lives, sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the USSR." It was also mentioned in the first resolution of the State Emergency Committee on the allocation of a 15-hectare plot for personal use to all interested residents of the cities. The seriousness of the intentions of the new old government was evidenced by tanks and armored personnel carriers that went on combat duty on Moscow streets and squares.

It is believed that the Emergency Committee had no support in society. This is not entirely true. Millions of people supported the "restoration of order" in one form or another, although the officials from the Committee could not boast of wide personal popularity among the people.

Mass demonstrations against the "putschists" were observed only in Moscow and Leningrad. In many regions and national republics, the ideas of the Soviet guards aroused sympathy. But the democratic opposition, which rallied around Yeltsin, turned out to be more proactive, younger, and more inventive in the struggle for minds. And the capital's street actions made a strong impression, first of all, on the leaders of the Emergency Committee, who did not want to shed blood.

The resistance factor

The Emergency Committee understood that Yeltsin, who was gaining strength and popularity, was the biggest problem for them. Two months before the events, he was elected president of the RSFSR in the first nationwide vote in the history of our country. When it became clear that it would not be possible to reach an agreement with him, the gatekeepers made a ridiculous attempt to arrest the president of Russia. But he made it safely to his office in the White House and publicly declared the GKCHP action a "right-wing reactionary unconstitutional coup" and called on Russian citizens to "give a decent response to the putschists and demand that the country return to normal constitutional development. Of course, it is necessary to provide an opportunity for President Gorbachev to address the people." Yeltsin's office found a succinct (though, of course, tendentious) definition for what happened — a coup. That's how the word stuck to the "three days of the State Committee." Yeltsin's performance on the armor of a tank, in the midst of the crowd, was another find. He won the competition of "pictures": the members of the Emergency Committee at the press conference, compared to him, looked pale and uncertain. Not everyone is allowed to engage in public policy...

For those who spent their nights on the barricades near the White House, the seat of the government of the RSFSR, these three days were filled with the romantic spirit of freedom. At that time, it seemed to many that by overcoming the resistance of the party conservatives belonging to the past, we would break into a bright future in which Western splendor and comfort would be combined with the Soviet spirit of justice, and abundance and prosperity with unlimited intellectual freedom.

The Soviet system was not adapted to "street politics." In the past, as a rule, protests were managed to be stopped at the level of preventive work. In 1990-91, during numerous rallies and demonstrations, in addition to riot police officers, operatives of the criminal investigation department and the OBKHSS went out to patrol the streets. They acted clumsily and indecisively, and did not have the necessary equipment. Well, the army was certainly not psychologically ready to deal with the suppression of unrest. Faced with peaceful resistance and vigorous counter-propaganda, the representatives of the Emergency Committee wavered. They realized that they would not be able to hold on to power without harsh military actions, and on the morning of August 21 they began to lose ground. At noon, they were still discussing the possibility of storming the White House, but the army had already been withdrawn from the capital, and at 16:00 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR declared the actions of the Emergency Committee illegal. In the evening, the dejected members of the Committee were arrested. Gorbachev returned to Moscow, but Yeltsin, who signed the decree on the dissolution of the CPSU, looked triumphant in those days... on August 22, a rally was held on the square in front of the White House. Euphoria, jubilation, tens of thousands of people who felt like winners.

The lessons of August

The sad consequences of this political spectacle were revealed immediately. The separatists took advantage of the GKCHP's failure. In Kiev, on August 24, the Supreme Council adopted the Act of Declaring Ukraine's Independence and at the same time banned the Communist Party. Nationalists have also become more active in other republics of the USSR. No one mentioned the results of the recent referendum in which the country's citizens voted to preserve the Union.

Mikhail Gorbachev, despite his popularity in the international arena, will not be able to regain power over the seething space of the Union after the August events. It is significant that the new government of the USSR, by and large, was never formed. The commodity deficit increased in autumn. Confusion reigned in society. It is quite natural that for most, the problems of survival have overshadowed everything that concerns the future of the country and other high matters. In December 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union was met with misunderstanding and apathy. The economic and political crisis lasted for a decade. The attempt to turn the day of the "victory of the democratic forces" — August 21 — into a public holiday failed.

Those dramatic events showed that the effectiveness of politics in critical days is largely determined by the ability to engage in dialogue with a society that consists of people of different backgrounds and beliefs. Nevertheless, they have a lot in common, and the political authorities are called upon to prevent confrontation and smooth out contradictions. Another lesson is that the government must act and look democratic, but at the same time — effectively. History prefers talented and inventive directing.

In 1991, the political elite behaved irresponsibly, bringing the country to the brink of civil war. The historical responsibility lies with both conservatives and radicals — from President Gorbachev to each of us.

An ill-conceived, feverish attempt to rally the Soviet space led to the disintegration of a huge country. The crisis phenomena, which the Gakapists rightly pointed out in their appeal to the people, have only worsened. On December 8, 1991, the leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine declared: "The USSR as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality ceases to exist." In those December days, many underestimated the tragic meaning of this decision. It seemed that it was only about removing Gorbachev from power, and the unity of the country would remain.

But among the severe results of the collapse of the USSR are broken families, split enterprises, large projects, and crossed out social achievements. The imbalance in the international orchestra has led to a series of wars and ethnic conflicts. And this list of sad consequences of a Soviet-style divorce can go on for a long time. Well, the only reasonable conclusion from this situation is the understanding that the issues of unity and security of the country should be treated seriously and responsibly.

The author is the deputy editor—in-chief of the magazine "Historian"