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Waiting for winter: gas reserves in Europe's storage facilities are lagging behind the norm
By mid-July, the European energy market traditionally passes the equator of the gas injection season in underground storage facilities. This period is usually accompanied by routine reports on the steady accumulation of reserves before the autumn cold weather. In 2026, Gas Infrastructure Europe statistics show a serious failure of established algorithms. Europe risks approaching the heating season with half-empty supplies. The continent has become dependent on American tankers, while the Middle East supply chain remains hampered by infrastructural losses and the extreme instability of recent diplomatic agreements. Details of the EU's problems with the formation of reserves for the winter can be found in the Izvestia article.
Half-empty storage facilities
By the end of the first decade of July, underground gas storage facilities (UGS) in the European Union were filled by an average of 61.8%. This figure is low by historical standards and one of the worst in the last decade. In previous years, including 2022-2024, by the same date, the stock level had confidently exceeded 80%.
The main problem is the fuel injection rate. The daily net inflow of gas into UGS facilities is now 35-40% lower than the long-term average. Traders refuse to buy the resource for future use due to the unfavorable price environment. The cost of a megawatt-hour at the Dutch TTF hub is firmly fixed in the range of €55-62 (about $650-730 per thousand cubic meters). Buying fuel at such prices, freezing expensive working capital (taking into account the high ECB rates) and additionally paying for storage services means working at a loss for private companies.
Market participants hope for a decline in quotations closer to August, but prices are not in a hurry to fall yet. While maintaining the current rate of pumping, the European Commission's standard — to fill reservoirs up to 90% by November 1 — becomes unattainable without direct government intervention and forced purchases at the expense of the budgets of the participating countries.
The supply shortage, which keeps quotes at peak levels, is still caused by the situation in the Persian Gulf. The formal truce between the parties to the Middle East conflict, which was announced in June, brought only situational relief. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is recovering extremely slowly. The owners of the tanker fleet and insurance syndicates in London note the extreme precariousness of the compromise reached: The parties continue to exchange harsh statements and sometimes blows, and the issues of safe passage of commercial vessels remain the subject of negotiations. Insurance premiums for entering the Persian Gulf do not return to normal values.
Even if the political agreements stand, Qatar's infrastructural losses do not allow it to return the required volumes of liquefied natural gas to the world market. The damaged production lines of the Ras Laffan plant require long months of repairs. The disposal of these capacities has created a vacuum that cannot be filled promptly with supplies from other regions.
The reduction in Middle Eastern volumes has led to a significant transformation in the structure of European imports. Last year, the share of American LNG in EU purchases ranged from 45-50%. Between April and July 2026, this figure jumped to an unprecedented 68-72%. Europe covers the rest of the demand with Algerian gas, Norwegian pipelines and purchases of Russian raw materials from Arctic projects, which Brussels has not been able to abandon due to severe shortages. If the restrictions that the EU has agreed on for Russian gas come into force in 2027, dependence on overseas suppliers will increase even more.
In turn, the United States is more focused on supplies to the east than across the Pacific Ocean. But it will not be a trivial task to further strengthen this area. The liquefaction terminals in Texas and Louisiana are operating at their maximum capacity, processing about 13-14 billion cubic feet (350 million cubic meters) per day. It is hardly possible to squeeze additional resources from this infrastructure to cover the European shortage in the foreseeable future.
Two threats
Monopoly reliance on the United States poses two acute threats to Europe in the coming months.
The first of them has a natural character. The hurricane season lasts from July to November in the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico. The LNG export infrastructure is concentrated on this coast. The approach of a severe storm requires a preventive stop of shipments and evacuation of personnel. If the disaster damages the energy supply to terminals or shipping channels for at least one to two weeks, the fuel balance in Europe will be disrupted. There are no backup sources in the world capable of intercepting American shipments that fall out, and given the situation with Qatar and Russia, it is not expected in the next couple of years. Yes, investments in LNG infrastructure made in recent years will pay off at some point, but it is unclear how much they will offset global demand growth.
The second threat lies in the plane of American domestic politics. Record LNG exports, superimposed on the summer heat and rising energy consumption by data centers, are pushing up natural gas prices within the United States itself. The Henry Hub gas price index is showing steady growth. Ahead of the November congressional elections, the administration of Donald Trump is under serious pressure from the industry lobby and ordinary voters unhappy with rising electricity bills.
The risk that the White House will resort to administrative restrictions on LNG exports in order to lower prices on the domestic market is assessed by relevant traders as non-zero. Such a political maneuver by Washington will leave European consumers alone with fuel shortages ahead of the first frost.
The pattern that developed by mid-summer demonstrates the deep vulnerability of the continental energy system. Brussels has completely lost control over its own energy security. The continent's ability to survive the coming winter without shutting down energy-intensive enterprises now depends on external variables. The current status quo requires European officials and businesses to closely monitor the weather reports in the Gulf of Mexico, the mood of politicians in Washington, and attempts to maintain a regime of silence in the Persian Gulf. Europe has few reliable internal mechanisms to protect itself from new price spikes.
Переведено сервисом «Яндекс Переводчик»