How the US ground operation in Iran could change the oil market. Analysis

The main thing in the material:

• If the United States launches a ground operation in Iran, the conflict will shift from a military to a resource-infrastructural plane.
• Control over uranium can be considered as a condition for pressure on oil exports and logistics
• In the event of the capture of Kharq and the coastal infrastructure of Hormuz, the United States will have a new opportunity to influence global energy supplies.
• The rules of the game in the market will change along with the pricing mechanism. Russia will benefit from this in the short term, but will face increasing systemic uncertainty.

The start of the US ground operation in Iran will mark the final transition to the struggle for control of resources and logistics. This will no longer be just a conflict over the nuclear program and "regime change" in Tehran: it will be an attempt to seize key resources — uranium and oil. But not only that. In a broader sense, Washington is probably considering the possibility of militarily taking over control of the supply of raw materials. If this scenario is realized, the very logic of global capital and energy flows, as well as risk formation patterns, will change. This will affect the rules of the game for all exporters, including Russia. Details can be found in the Izvestia article.

Not for the sake of the regime, but for the sake of the asset

If earlier the US policy towards Iran was based around deterrence or attempts at regime change, then in the case of a transition to a ground operation, control over strategic assets will become a key task. This version is supported by facts from articles by Bloomberg and The Wall Street Journal — according to them, President Donald Trump is considering seizing about 450 kg of Iranian uranium by force. Sources believe that this is a difficult and risky task, which could delay American troops in the country.

The seizure of uranium in this context is not only a matter of non—proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is an attempt to remove the most dangerous long-term geopolitical "option" from the market: the risk that Iran retains the ability to quickly return to nuclear escalation. By depriving the Islamic Republic of such leverage, the United States will have new ways of pressure — Washington can take control of oil exports and logistics without unacceptable risks. In other words, control over uranium in this design is a condition for managing the flow of raw materials.

Trump has already threatened to seize the strategically important island of Kharq in the Persian Gulf. Approximately 90% of Iranian oil supplies pass through it. In March, the Americans attacked the island, but the oil infrastructure was not affected, which is significant — establishing control over it is much more effective than destroying it. This would provide a new tool for pressure, since the Iranian economy, which has already suffered due to years of sanctions, is heavily dependent on oil revenues.

In theory, by seizing Kharq, it would be possible to force Tehran to open the Strait of Hormuz to all ships, and not to the "chosen ones", as it is now. However, getting to the island is not as easy as Trump claims. Kharq is located 30 km from the mainland of the country, in the north of the Persian Gulf. This means that any ships carrying troops, ammunition and other military cargo will have to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, where they can become a target for missiles and drones, as well as attack boats. Even if the ships remain outside the gulf and the ground forces are airlifted, aviation will also be vulnerable to attacks. Iran may also use scorched earth tactics, destroying its own oil infrastructure and the runway in Kharq to prevent the seizure of territory. In addition, taking and holding the island would require a long-term stay of the US military there, which is risky and fraught with retaliatory actions.: Iran is likely to intensify attacks on the energy infrastructure of the Middle East. The invasion could also prompt Iranian-backed Houthi fighters to attack ships in the Red Sea, which Saudi Arabia uses as an alternative route for oil exports. All this will further excite the oil and gas markets. Higher energy prices could accelerate global inflation. And the United States will not be able to stay away — gasoline prices in the country are already rising, and fuel availability will be a key issue in the midterm congressional elections at the end of the year. For example, in California, where the fuel market is most sensitive to supply disruptions, prices are already approaching $6 per gallon. This is largely due to the fact that the state is partially dependent on external supplies and has limited processing capacity. Chevron has already warned that California faces a fuel crisis if the war with Iran does not stop.

Destroying Hark, which Trump also threatened, would be less far-sighted than seizing the island. In addition to gaining new leverage, the United States could control the supply of oil on the market — the volume of supplies and their direction. But only a Hard Drive is not enough for this — the oil loaded at this terminal can leave the region only through the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, Washington will have to establish control over this logistics corridor, through which a fifth of the global maritime trade in oil and LNG passes. This is potentially possible when establishing control over the coastal infrastructure during a land operation.

It turns out that the new war in the Middle East no longer fits into the "regime change — stabilization — withdrawal" scheme. It's about capturing critical resources, holding export channels, and dictating access conditions. The conflict is clearly becoming resource-based and infrastructural. The main stakes in it are the energy needed by the market and the ability to use control levers as bargaining chips at the negotiating table.

Whoever controls the route dictates the prices.

If the United States manages to establish control over Iraq and Hormuz, the entire mechanics of the oil market will change. Now, despite all the politicization, the market still adheres to classical logic: the price is formed through the balance of supply and demand, and geopolitics acts as a risk premium. Conflicts could affect production volumes, routes, and prices, but they did not call into question the very fact of delivery. The situation that had developed by the end of March had already partially changed this principle. Oil is still being extracted and formally remains available, however, a reduction in traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and an increase in insurance rates lead to violations of supply guarantees. These risks become an independent pricing factor.

That is, the system is still functioning, but in a reduced mode. A fundamentally different situation will arise in the case of direct US influence on key nodes. In this scenario, we are no longer talking about an adjustment, but about a redistribution of power over the flow — the delivery of oil will become manageable. The market will depend not only on fundamental factors, but also on the decisions of the party controlling the infrastructure and route. Such controls will inevitably affect the supply of energy resources from all the Persian Gulf countries and will affect both the European and Asian markets, which are heavily dependent on them. For these regions, the issue of energy supply ceases to be exclusively commercial and becomes political.

Oil turns into a resource with different levels of availability, which creates a new price structure where an access premium is added to the base cost of the resource. In this scenario, oil will become steadily volatile: if in the previous model price spikes were event—driven, then in the new model fluctuations will become part of a permanent regime, as the market will impose a stable risk premium: the flow can be limited, interrupted or redirected at any time. As a result, the market gets not stability, but a new form of instability — manageable, but permanent.

What does this mean for Russia?

For Russia, the US ground operation in Iran will have a dual effect. On the one hand, rising oil prices in the short term improves export performance and increases budget revenues. When oil goes above $100, and the market starts discussing the levels of $120-150 as a realistic range, exporting countries receive additional income without an increase in physical supplies. The Financial Times estimates that Moscow earns up to $150 million a day in additional income from taxes on oil sales. By the end of March, the amount of these revenues could range from $3.3 billion to $4.9 billion.

On the other hand, if Washington really translates the Middle East conflict into the logic of direct flow control, then not only the one who has the barrels wins, but also the one who is able to provide a transport corridor. The situation in the Strait of Hormuz does not directly affect Russia's export routes, but the indirect dependence remains high, since any disruptions in this corridor directly affect global prices. As a result, Russian oil is sold at a price that is determined, including by the conditions of supply in the Persian Gulf.

U.S. control of Hormuz will increase the overall level of politicization of energy trade and logistical nervousness. This creates a situation in which even alternative suppliers are involved in a high-risk system, and rising prices are accompanied by a decrease in market predictability. For the budget, this means higher revenues at the moment, but a decrease in their sustainability in the medium term due to increased dependence on external factors. For companies, the complexity of contractual conditions, the rising cost of insurance and the need to include additional risks in logistics.

Therefore, it makes sense to describe the US ground operation in Iran not as another war in the Middle East, but as a symbol of the world economy's final departure from the principles of traditional market exchange of values. Resources are no longer just mined, insured, and sold. They are expropriated, held, and redistributed by force. And in such a model, the main question is no longer who wins on the map, but who is able to change the rules of the game.