The United States is running out of rare earths needed for weapons production. What could possibly go wrong

The military conflict between the United States and Iran has shown that stocks of precision weapons are being used up faster than they can be replenished. Against this background, a much deeper vulnerability has emerged — the dependence of the American military-industrial complex on rare earth metals and Chinese processing, without which the production of modern weapons is impossible. Izvestia investigated whether this factor could limit the ability of the United States to wage a protracted war and whether China could turn control of rare earths into an instrument of pressure on Washington.

China as a lever of pressure

In the war that Israel and the United States have unleashed against Iran, one very strong player is underestimated — China. Beijing is heavily dependent on energy supplies passing through the Strait of Hormuz, and is extremely interested in ending the conflict and resuming normal navigation. In this context, China has a lever of pressure on the United States — rare earth metals, which are necessary for the American military industry to conduct military operations. According to the South China Morning Post, Washington's heavy dependence on Chinese resources suggests that Beijing can dictate how long the US strikes on Iran will last. Sources note that the Americans have enough reserves of rare earths for only two months, and the topic of supplies will clearly be discussed at the talks between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping scheduled for next month.

In fact, this does not mean that the United States physically has 60 days left of rare earths. The proven reserves in the country are estimated at 1.9 million tons. For comparison, Chinese reserves amount to 44 million tons. This does not mean that they are in stock and ready for use — we are talking about reserves in the depths, and not ready-made alloys or oxides of the required purity.

A separate aspect is the current production and processing in the United States. In 2024, 45 thousand tons of rare earth metals were produced there. But this also does not mean that the entire volume remains inside the country and immediately goes to defense needs. The United States accounts for 11% of global production, but it has almost no processing capacity — the United States exports concentrate and then imports compounds and components.

China produces 70% of the world's rare earths and controls almost all of their processing — 90%. For some minerals, the share of Chinese processing reaches 99%. Thus, even if metals are mined in the United States, they often still pass through Chinese technological chains before turning into components suitable for the military-industrial complex. The most sensitive part of the chain here is permanent magnets, which are needed for military equipment. According to industry estimates, China controls about 90% of the production of rare earth magnets. Even if individual projects appear in other countries, the scale is still not comparable and in the near future everything will remain that way.

The role of rare earths in the military-industrial complex

Rare earths are used in a number of key US defense systems, including F-35 fighter jets, Virginia and Columbia class submarines, Tomahawk missiles, radar systems, Predator unmanned aerial vehicles. According to some calculations, each F-35 Lightning II fighter contains more than 400 kg of rare earths, and the Virginia submarine contains over 4 tons. Rare earths are used in radars, sensors, lasers, electronics and other subsystems.

If China tightens restrictions on exports of rare earths, the United States will be able to partially soften the blow in the short term at the expense of strategic reserves. The country has a national defense reserve of rare earths (Defense National Stockpile), but its structure and actual volumes are not disclosed. One can only find purchase guidelines: for example, in 2025 it was planned to purchase 450 tons of magnets, 1.1 thousand tons of lanthanum, 300 tons of neodymium-praseodymium oxide, 60 tons of samarium-cobalt alloy. This shows which materials are considered the most in demand for the American military industry. It is known that the reserve is limited, and its reserves cannot always be quickly integrated into production chains.

Against this background, in February, the Trump administration announced plans to create a strategic reserve of critical minerals worth $12 billion. According to the plan, it should also cover civilian needs.​ At the same time, in order to reduce dependence on China in the field of rare earths, the United States is looking for alternative sources of supply, including Ukraine and, possibly, Greenland.

Why is "two months" about contractors?

Most likely, the estimates currently circulating in the media about the "two-month reserves of rare earths" relate to the operational reserves of specific manufacturers and contractors. Companies usually do not keep significant inventory. And if something shocking happens in the system - for example, new export restrictions from China — then some defense contractors may face shortages in a matter of months. The first thing they end up with is not rare earths in general, but specific components. And as soon as one of these elements disappears, production stops entirely. It is impossible to assemble a rocket at 85% — it is either completely assembled or not assembled at all.

For example, the Tomahawk long-range cruise missile has control surfaces (rudders) that adjust its flight. They are controlled by electromechanical actuators, which contain compact electric motors. Such engines use neodymium magnets with the addition of dysprosium, and sometimes terbium, which allows them to maintain magnetic properties at high temperatures and loads. Rare earth elements are also used in temperature and pressure sensors, in control and guidance systems — as part of electronics, sensors and gyroscopes.

The war factor in Iran

In this context, the significant consumption of ammunition that is currently being observed in the conflict with Iran increases the problem for the United States. The higher the rate of use of missiles and other complex systems, the faster new ones need to be released. And production runs into those very bottlenecks — elements that are necessary for the production of weapons, but which are difficult to extract and process outside of China.

According to the Washington Post, in the first two days of the military campaign against Iran, the Pentagon spent $5.6 billion in ammunition. According to other sources, the six days of war cost the Pentagon more than $11.3 billion. The actual costs are probably much higher, as this amount does not include the cost of operating the ships and maintaining personnel stationed in the region. Against this background, there is growing concern on Capitol Hill about the rate at which the US armed forces are depleting stocks of the most advanced American weapons. The Trump administration is expected to ask lawmakers for an additional defense budget totaling $50 billion. But getting it through Congress won't be easy.

On the eve of the operation, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces, General Dan Kane, warned Trump that a protracted conflict with Iran could lead to the depletion of stocks of precision weapons, which were undermined by years of military support for Ukraine and Washington's involvement in armed conflicts in other countries. The media reports that stocks of Tomahawks are declining after their use against targets in Nigeria, Yemen and Iran. In 2020, the United States allegedly had 4,000 such missiles. And the release of them has since been limited — only a few hundred. Purchases were also slow. In 2026, it was planned to purchase only 57 Tomahawks. The United States is going to increase the production of missiles to 1,000 units per year, but it will definitely not be able to reach this level in a short time.

It is not known for certain how much ammunition the United States has spent during the current campaign in Iran. There was evidence of the use of more than 2 thousand units to destroy 5 thousand targets in the early days. This included 400 cruise missiles (mostly Tomahawks), which is 10% of their stocks, and about a hundred anti-missiles.

The rate of replenishment of the arsenal of weapons is clearly lagging behind the pace of the current conflict. Replenishment of stocks directly depends on production capacities, which are just beginning to accelerate, and the lag here is measured not in weeks, but in years. At the same time, it is obvious that in the current context, the war rests not only on resources and money, but also on technological bottlenecks.

The paradox is that the conflict burns billions of dollars, which are valued at finished products, while shortages occur in the chain of materials, the cost of which is orders of magnitude lower. Significantly, in 2025, imports of rare earth compounds and metals to the United States increased by 169%, and the estimated value of these supplies decreased to $165 million from $168 million in 2024. It turns out that modern warfare is not a budget competition, but a supply chain competition. The winner is the one with fewer bottlenecks.