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The FSB uncovered two more spies working under the cover of the British Embassy in Moscow. Over the past six months, it has become known about the intelligence activities of nine people from the United Kingdom. Details can be found in the Izvestia article.

What is known about British spies in Russia

On March 10, the Federal Security Service announced the identification of two more spies who worked at the British Embassy in Moscow. They are the second secretary of the Embassy, Alkesh Odedra, and the husband of the first secretary of the diplomatic mission's political department, Michael Skinner. It is clarified that when they received permission to enter Russia, they intentionally provided false information, which violated the country's legislation. In Russia, Odedra and Skinner were engaged in "intelligence and subversive activities that threaten Russia's security."

The spies have been stripped of their accreditations, and they must leave Russia within two weeks. This is stated in the message of the Russian Foreign Ministry in the Telegram channel.

"The Russian Foreign Ministry, in cooperation with the relevant departments, has decided to revoke the accreditations of Alkesh Odedra and Michael Skinner, and they are ordered to leave Russia within two weeks," the ministry said.

A representative of the British Embassy in Russia was summoned to the Foreign Ministry following the incident. When leaving the building, he did not answer the journalists' questions.

This is not the first time that employees of the British diplomatic mission have been expelled over the past six months.

So, in September 2024, six employees of the political department of the British diplomatic mission also had their accreditations revoked. These are embassy employees Jessica Davenport, Grace Alvin, Andrew Daft Callum, Catherine McDonnell, Thomas John Hixon and Blake Pattel.

It was noted that they had received documents confirming London's coordination of the escalation of the military-political situation in the world. Thus, the Directorate of Eastern Europe and Central Asia of the British Foreign Office was named the main structure responsible for coordinating subversive policies in the Russian Federation and the CIS.

The FSB clarified that after the start of the special operation, this directorate became a special service whose main task was to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. In the end, the ministry continued, all the revealed facts "give grounds to consider the activities of British diplomats sent to Moscow through the directorate as threatening the security of the Russian Federation."

Later, in November 2024, the espionage activities of the second secretary of the British Embassy department, Wilkes Edward Pryor, were revealed. He also carried out intelligence and subversive work that threatened Russia's security. Pryor left Russia within two weeks.

The intelligence services were able to establish that Pryor had replaced one of the six British intelligence officers expelled from Russia in August of this year. While receiving permission to enter the Russian Federation, the "diplomat" intentionally provided false information, thus violating Russian law. It has been established that Pryor was sent to Moscow through the Directorate of Eastern Europe and Central Asia of the British Foreign Ministry.

"The FSB of Russia will continue to work to counter the intelligence and subversive activities of foreign special services by all available methods," the department added.

As the Rossiya-24 TV channel (VGTRK) reported at the time, the spies met with representatives of the media and NGOs-foreign agents, including Memorial and Novaya Gazeta, which was recognized in the Russian Federation as a foreign agent and liquidated by a court decision (recognized in the Russian Federation as a foreign agent).

As ex-FSB General Alexander Mikhailov stated on Channel Five at the time, the expulsion of six British diplomats from Russia for preparing provocations is a failure that characterizes the entire intelligence service of the United Kingdom.

According to him, the quality of intelligence work is judged by their failures, and the British had a lot of them. At the same time, the FSB was always aware of the activities of these individuals, and as a result, a logical end came, which the diplomats themselves knew about, Mikhailov added.

In turn, Alexei Martynov, a political scientist and associate professor at the Financial University under the Government of Russia, called the work of spies under the roof of diplomatic missions a textbook practice.
"As a rule, in a hundred cases out of a hundred, all their espionage activity is detected very quickly," the expert believes.

Martynov pointed out that since Soviet times, Russian counterintelligence has traditionally been known as one of the strongest in the world, and British spies are well aware of this and are ready to be expelled for illegal activities. According to the political scientist, in this case, the defendants were unlikely to hide for a long time, and the relevant departments have already identified all their contacts within the framework of established practice.

What is known about the spies and saboteurs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Russia

In addition to revealing the espionage activities of employees of foreign diplomatic missions, the FSB regularly declassifies people recruited by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Russia. On February 18, three people were detained in the Zaporizhia region on suspicion of espionage.

These are two citizens of Ukraine and one citizen of the Russian Federation who were involved in transmitting information about the location of Russian military equipment to a foreign party. This information was needed to adjust the attacks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on Russian positions.

It is noted that one of the detainees contacted a representative of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and, carrying out his tasks, involved two acquaintances in collecting data on the location, number and routes of movement of units of Russian troops in the SVO zone. A criminal case has been opened under Article 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation ("Espionage") and Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation ("High treason").

On February 14, the main directorate of the FSB of Russia for the Black Sea Fleet reported the detention of a resident of Crimea, who transmitted information about military installations of the Russian Armed Forces on the territory of the republic to the special services of Ukraine.

Earlier, on February 11, the Kherson Regional Court sentenced a local resident to 11.5 years in a high-security penal colony in a case of espionage in the interests of the Ukrainian special services. It was established that from March to April 2023, he collected and transmitted information via messenger about the locations of the Russian Armed Forces and the location of communications facilities in the region to the Ukrainian side.

Переведено сервисом «Яндекс Переводчик»

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