"The amount of EU losses from the sanctions standoff with Russia is already huge"
Russia and HATO retain "hot" communication lines and opportunities for emergency contacts in case of emergencies. Vladislav Maslennikov, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department of European Affairs, told Izvestia. He emphasized: NATO continues unrestrained militarization of Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region, which poses threats to the Russian Federation. According to him, Russian diplomats have faced unprecedented pressure in Europe in recent years, and the situation is only getting worse. However, Russia is open to a normal, civilized dialogue with European states. Moscow remains a member of the OSCE, while seeking the relocation of the ODIHR headquarters from Poland. Russia also retains its membership of the Arctic Council. Our country is ready to work in this format based on its national interests, the diplomat noted. On the prospects for the development of relations between Russia and the European Union, as well as Europe's losses from anti-Russian sanctions - in an exclusive interview with Vladislav Maslennikov "Izvestia".
"In the European Union reluctantly, but still recognize the negative impact of unilateral anti-Russian restrictions"
- On January 9, Germany hosted a meeting in the "Ramstein" format, at which the new head of European diplomacy, Kaja Kallas, said that the EU is ready to take the leading role in military aid to Ukraine if the US refuses to do so. How does Russia assess this? And what does Russia expect from the renewed leadership of the European Commission?
- We can hardly expect any changes in their approach to our country from the new leadership of the European Commission, be it in energy, support for Ukraine or other issues. As far as we understand, Brussels is really afraid that the new US administration (Donald Trump will be inaugurated on January 20 - Ed.) may change its approach in terms of supporting the Kiev regime. And, accordingly, in this regard, the statement of Kai Kallas is not surprising. To what extent they will be able to implement it is another question. It is clear that EU funds are not infinite. A huge amount of European taxpayers' money has already been pumped into the "black hole" of the Kiev regime.
Hence the idea of Brussels putting its hand on the proceeds of frozen Russian sovereign assets. This shows us that the rules on which a certain "order" is based are changed on the fly and are actually rewritten to suit the tasks at hand. They wanted to get their hands on these revenues, on Russian assets first, and a very dubious legal basis is being used for this. Now, apparently, their appetite is growing further, and there are calls to take away the assets themselves.
- The EU is already actively discussing the details of the new 16th package of anti-Russian sanctions. In 2023, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko said that the total losses of the European Union from sanctions against Russia over ten years reached about $1.5 billion. How much is this figure now?
- The European Union reluctantly but nevertheless acknowledges the negative impact of unilateral anti-Russian restrictions on the economic well-being of the countries that are members of this organization.
Quantitative assessments of the economic damage to the European Union from the anti-Russian policy can vary considerably depending on who takes into account what indicators and for what period. For example, one can take into account multi-billion (about €300 billion) state aid programs, which can cover only a small share of the damage to the population and businesses. In the Federal Republic of Germany, which is the leader in terms of state subsidies, the economy was plunged into recession anyway.
The direct costs of the anti-Russian course should also include the allocation of funds to maintain the viability of the Kiev regime, meeting its macro-financial, military and corruption demands, as well as the growth of its own defense budgets (more than €120 billion).
The European Union's losses also include the additional costs that the EU countries have to bear due to the rejection of more profitable and affordable Russian hydrocarbons. According to the European Commission's calculations, the "restructuring" of the EU energy system for the period until 2027 will require an additional €210 billion.
The European Union's losses can also be attributed to a significant reduction in exports of EU products to Russia. Thus, according to Eurostat, only for 2022-2023 the volume of goods supplies to Russia has fallen by €51 billion (to about €38 billion). This year, the reduction in mutual trade turnover between Russia and the EC continued. Thus, at the end of the first half of 2024, exports from the EC to Russia amounted to only €16 billion, having decreased by almost €5 billion compared to the same period last year. Western companies also suffered multi-billion dollar losses, as they were forced to leave the Russian market or reduce their presence in it under pressure from their governments.
Finally, we can also take into account the loss in GDP growth dynamics. Back at the beginning of 2022, in its economic forecast, the European Commission assumed that the bloc's economy would grow by at least 4%. As a result, it amounted to 3.4% in 2022, and fell to 0.4% in 2023. At the end of last year, according to official data, it is expected to be about 0.9%. Thus, the countries of the bloc have lost many hundreds of billions of euros only since 2022.
So the amount of EC losses from the sanctions confrontation with Russia is already huge and continues to grow like a snowball.
- On January 1, Ukraine stopped the transit of Russian gas to European countries, which, in particular, affected Slovakia and raised gas prices in Europe. Is Russia ready to continue exporting gas to European countries? Are potential gas supplies possible through the surviving string of Nord Stream-2?
- Russia has always taken a responsible approach to fulfilling its contractual obligations to supply energy resources, and for decades it has consistently provided most EU member states with gas and oil. At the same time, the Russian side has often had to fulfill its contractual obligations in situations (long before the CBO) when the European Commission was actually engaged in sabotaging the normal interaction between Russia and the EC in the energy sector, changed the "rules of the game" on the fly and tried its best to complicate or disrupt supplies in order to then accuse Russia of unreliability as an exporter and thus necessitate the search for alternative suppliers. The strengthening of Russian-European energy cooperation was already bothering many in the West, especially in the United States.
President Vladimir Putin repeatedly declared Russia's readiness to supply blue fuel to Europe both through Ukraine and through the surviving Nord Stream 2 pipeline (two strings of Nord Stream and one of Nord Stream 2 were undermined by sabotage in September 2022). - Ed.). However, the future of such supplies depends on the positions of the transit and the buyers - Kiev and the EU countries.
The ruling coalition in Germany has no interest in resuming purchases through Nord Stream. Together with the statements of the European Commission representatives, in fact, expressing support for the position of Ukraine, this only confirms that the dominant political forces in the EU are terribly far from the interests of both industrial and business circles, as well as ordinary citizens of European countries.
"In recent years, we have faced the strongest pressure on our diplomats in Europe"
- In 2024, the Department of Pan-European Cooperation of the Russian Foreign Ministry was renamed the Department of European Affairs. What was the reason for its renaming?
- The renaming of the Department of Pan-European Cooperation (DEC) to the Department of European Problems (DEP) is one of the manifestations of the MFA's adaptation to the changing geopolitical realities and a consequence of the obvious degradation of multilateral cooperation structures in Europe provoked by Western countries. Of course, the Department continues to deal with a range of issues related to the activities of the OSCE, the European Union, HATO and the Council of Europe. However, we are now in many respects setting the emphasis of our work in a different way. Through the efforts of our former partners, the sign in the interaction has changed from "plus" to "minus".
In addition, the functionality of the renewed department has been significantly expanded - it has been given responsibility for regional co-operation in the Arctic and the Baltic, as well as foreign policy aspects of the Kaliningrad region's livelihood.
In the current geopolitical conditions, it seems possible to speak about a unified Baltic-Arctic region, the strategic importance of which is significantly increasing against the background of the growth of military-political tension in the Arctic and the Baltic provoked by the West, as well as the degradation of the previously highly demanded architecture of regional interaction.
As is well known, our country was forced to withdraw from the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council. In the Arctic, the desire of Western countries to confront us rather than to cooperate is becoming more and more obvious. The Arctic Council, the only surviving format for multilateral interaction in the high latitudes, has also degenerated after Western countries froze its full-fledged activity in March 2022.
However, it is still alive, and we are ready to work in this format based on our national interests. There is no doubt that Russia's presence in the North will be further strengthened. And here we are ready for mutually beneficial cooperation with new, including extra-regional partners.
- Has the vision of Europe changed in Russia's eyes?
- First of all, Europe and the European Union are not the same thing. Russia is an indivisible part of Europe. What has changed is the EC's policy towards our country.
For quite a long time we considered the EU as a key economic partner. And this was objectively true. At a certain stage, the EC accounted for about half of Russia's foreign trade turnover.
However, the EU turned out to be a very unreliable partner, capable of destroying in the shortest possible time the decades-long trade and economic cooperation with Russia, including in the energy sector. And it was on the energy partnership with us that the well-being of many EC member states was based.
- Is Russia open to dialog with European countries?
- We do not close our doors to European countries. And this has been repeatedly publicly emphasized by the leadership of our country. Of course, if they refuse in principle to confront Russia, including attempts to interfere in our internal affairs. We are open to a normal, civilized dialogue with European countries on issues of interest to us. We are ready for mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation, restoration of human, cultural and sports contacts. We continue to maintain them with individual European capitals, albeit in a reduced volume.
When European elites realize that confrontation with Russia is a path to nowhere, then, apparently, the time will come to restore certain ties. But again, I emphasize - in those areas that will be of interest to us. Obviously, we cannot talk about restoring trust in the EC any time soon.
Against the background of what is currently happening in Europe, I believe that the restoration of relations with European countries will be possible only after the emergence of leaders who are focused on their own national interests and are capable of pragmatic and respectful dialog.
- Since 2022, Western countries have announced the expulsion of more than 600 Russian diplomatic staff of various ranks. Is the pressure on Russian diplomats in European countries increasing now?
- There is no doubt that in recent years we have faced the strongest pressure on our diplomats in Europe. This started back in 2014. But after the start of the SWO, we have seen absolutely unprecedented actions against our diplomats - unjustified expulsions, demands to reduce their number in European countries.
In Europe, there are periodic ideas that we should limit the possibility of their movement in European countries. It is clear that in relations with us, Europeans can always count on a mirror response. But, in fact, their approach is absolutely wrong: blocking channels, especially diplomatic ones, in the current geopolitical situation is absolutely counterproductive.
- But in your assessment, are the conditions for the full-fledged work of Russian diplomats deteriorating, or is nothing changing in principle?
- They are getting worse.
- In the past, the European Commission initiated a review of the rules for issuing visas to Russians. Brussels noted that Russian citizens traveling in the Schengen zone pose a "security threat." Does Russia expect serious visa restrictions for Russians? Is Moscow ready to mirror the EU's response in case of any restrictions?
- Former European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ilve Johansson's proposal to tighten visa rules for Russians "for security reasons" is yet another indication of how the EU is trying to cover up its problems with the myth of a "threat from the East". First of all, we are talking about the crisis in the migration sphere. Through their geopolitical adventures, the European Union has destabilized states in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, and now they are trying to shift responsibility to Russia and its citizens. In doing so, they are forgetting about their own declared ideals - freedom of movement and non-discrimination.
For its part, Russia intends to remain open to foreigners, including Europeans, who wish to visit our country and are interested in Russian culture. Moreover, under a decree by Russian President Vladimir Putin, citizens of a number of HATO and EC member countries who share our spiritual and moral values now have a simplified procedure for obtaining residence permits in our country.
"No one has taken OSCE reform off the agenda".
- In December, the Russian delegation took part in the meeting of foreign ministers (SMID) of the OSCE member states in Malta. It is known that the OSCE is currently experiencing a deep crisis, but there is no talk of Russia leaving the organization as it did from the Council of Europe. Is there any possibility of Russia leaving the organization in the future?
- We know that our withdrawal from the OSCE would be very much desired by Poland, the Baltic States and some others in their anti-Russian obsession. However, we are raising the question on a different plane: not whether or not to withdraw from the OSCE, but to what extent the potential of the OSCE with its principle of the sovereign equality of States and the rule of consensus is in demand for its participants. The question is also whether the organization will be able to overcome the deepest crisis it is currently in.
The OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Malta demonstrated that there is interest on this platform, although not among all States, in restoring the normal work of the OSCE in the three dimensions: politico-military, economic and environmental and humanitarian. However, Western attempts to turn the OSCE into yet another mechanism for promoting a "rules-based order" are obvious.
Participants in the 31st Ministerial Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Even with the minimal level of trust and the atmosphere of hostility that currently prevails in the OSCE, the participating States have managed to agree on candidates for the new leadership of the organization - the Secretary General and the heads of the executive structures: the Director of the ODIHR, the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Representative on Freedom of the Media. It is important that these new persons take a responsible approach to fulfilling their mandates and work impartially in the interests of all States without exception.
- Does Russia intend to seek the relocation of the headquarters of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) from Poland to another country? What alternative could we offer for the location of the headquarters?
- No one has taken OSCE reform, the need for which we have been talking about for many years, off the agenda. We should start with the ODIHR. The Office has completely discredited itself as a participant in international election observation. ODIHR's activities are characterized by double standards and inconsistencies in its electoral methodology, biased assessments, and the deliberate division of states into "immature" and "mature" democracies.
OSCE Headquarters building in Warsaw
Why are we pushing for the relocation of the Office's headquarters from Warsaw? Poland has demonstrated a persistent inability to host a number of national delegations on its territory during OSCE events and to guarantee their security. Entry visas are denied not only to officials but even to representatives of NGOs. Under these flagrant conditions, not only Russia but also many of our allies do not see any possibility of asking Warsaw, which has shown by its behaviour that it is not worthy of hosting OSCE events. We believe that the venue for all humanitarian events should be a country whose authorities are not indifferent to the task of correcting the serious "imbalances" in the ODIHR's activities.
"Russia has never sought to worsen relations with HATO"
- Relations between Russia and HATO are now at their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. In addition, alliance countries regularly raise the stakes in the standoff, for example, by authorizing Ukraine to launch Western weapons strikes on Russian territory. Does the Russian Federation now retain contacts with NATO in case of a sharp aggravation of the military and political situation?
- For emergency cases, Russia and HATO retain the so-called "hot" lines of communication and opportunities for emergency contacts. As for normal contacts and dialog mechanisms that could have been used to find ways to reduce tension, the alliance has abandoned them. That was not our choice. Back in 2014, the NATO alliance unilaterally ended cooperation with us in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) on military and civilian lines.
I should remind you that the CPH was created precisely as an "all-weather" format of cooperation. The Alliance prevented our diplomats from working in Brussels, reduced their numbers, and forbade them from communicating with their colleagues from NATO countries. In response, we had to decide to suspend the functioning of Russia's post mission to HATO in November 2021, the activities of the HATO military liaison mission in Moscow, and the closure of the bloc's Informburo in our country.
Relations between Russia and HATO are now not just at their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. The alliance has taken an unequivocal course to antagonize our country and contain the alleged "threat" coming from us. This is happening in all spheres and along all azimuths.
Russia has never sought to worsen relations with HATO. The blame for their degradation lies entirely with the alliance. We are not going to attack NATO countries and are not making such aggressive plans.
- The largest military airbase in Europe, HATO, is currently under construction in Romania. Bulgaria plans to build an alliance base on its territory this year. Does this pose a threat to Russia's security, and are there any risks that the alliance will continue its expansion into the region?
- Certainly, it poses threats to us. NATO continues unrestrained militarization of Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region under the slogan of strengthening the security of the Euro-Atlantic space in case of conflict with Russia. This expansion will continue; the imaginary Russian "threat" is just a convenient pretext for it.
Military contingents are being built up, not only national armed forces, but also coalition tactical combat groups that can be brought up to brigade level. Warehouses are being built for the forward deployment of weapons and military equipment, and logistics infrastructure is being developed in order to quickly reinforce "any threatened member of the North Atlantic Alliance".
For 25 years of continuous expansion of the bloc, the HATO war machine has come close to Russia's borders. At the same time, the alliance continues to insist on its allegedly exclusively defensive nature.
By the way, aggressive and provocative activities in the Black Sea region are not limited to the territory of the countries - members of the military bloc. The NATO is actively working in Moldova and Transcaucasia in order to strengthen its positions and influence there, to create new dividing lines and to impose external models of regional security. To be more precise, they are creating hotbeds of instability and threats to Russia's security from the southern direction. We will monitor what is happening, assess emerging risks and take them into account in the course of our work.
- At the end of last year, another EU-Western Balkans summit took place. The new head of the European Council, António Costa, stated that the EU and the Balkans belong to one European family, and the enlargement policy is the priority of the new EU leadership. How do you assess the prospects of the Balkan states joining the EU?
- The story with the new wave of EU enlargement, which started with the Western Balkans and now has been supplemented by some new candidates, in particular Ukraine and Moldova, has been dragging on for quite a long time.
Brussels has been "marinating" the Balkan countries in the issue of European integration for quite a long time: some of them have long been granted candidate status, for example, Montenegro and Serbia. Some have only recently been granted candidate status. The latest was Bosnia and Herzegovina.
At the same time, the topic of EU enlargement was activated by Brussels only against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis. Possible dates of accession began to appear, both by the candidate countries themselves and by the EU. But there is a twofold process here. On the one hand, it was activated by Brussels, because at some point they began to realize that European enthusiasm in the Balkans was fading away. On the other hand, they have new reference points and new candidates - Kiev and Chisinau.
"The Council of Europe pursues a purely unfriendly policy towards Russia"
- In March 2022, Russia announced its withdrawal from the Council of Europe. Does our country consider the possibility of returning to this organization? Under what conditions would it be possible?
- During 26 years of participation in the Council of Europe (CoE), Russia has made a significant contribution to the activities of this organization, including in the implementation of the goal of achieving greater unity among member countries, as enshrined in the CoE charter. However, under the pressure of the Western majority, this once authoritative organization is steadily losing its unifying potential.
Instead of achieving the ideals enshrined in the CoE Charter of "strengthening peace based on justice and international cooperation", Strasbourg began to promote a "rules-based world order". Multidisciplinary cooperation in applied areas, which Russia had consistently advocated, became impossible due to double standards and biased approaches. Under the pretext of protecting human rights, the CoE has adopted a course of blatant interference in the internal affairs of "undesirable" states.
Council of Europe Heads of State and Government Summit in Reykjavik
The Council of Europe pursues a purely unfriendly policy towards Russia. The goals of containing Russia and further complicity with the Kiev regime are enshrined in the documents of the fourth summit of the CoE in Reykjavik in 2023, as well as the session of the Committee of Ministers of the CoE in 2024. Within the framework of this organization there is actually "legal aggression" against Russia - pseudo-legal mechanisms are being developed to "hold Russia accountable" for conducting the CBO. The activities and decisions of such structures are legally null and void, and we regard joining them as a hostile act.
Thus, we cannot speak not only of a return, but even of the possibility of Russia's interaction with the current Council of Europe. I am convinced that all States that uphold the principles of a just multipolar world order are soberly assessing the destructive actions of this organization.
