Winter in Kabul: Why the USSR brought troops to Afghanistan
On December 25, 1979, the Soviet troops started to enter Afghanistan. Izvestiya" analyzedhow and why the USSR leadership made this decision.
Eastern labyrinths
The Soviet Union has always had almost cloudless relations with the Kingdom of Afghanistan. They did not deteriorate even during the military dictatorship of Mohammed Daoud. But in April 1978, the Marxist People's Democratic Party overthrew General Daoud without Soviet help and proclaimed a course of building a socialist economy, friendship with Moscow, and breaking the clan system, which for centuries had been based on the Islamic worldview. The Afghan leap "from feudalism to socialism" was perceived in the USSR as another foreign policy victory.
But it was increasingly difficult for the Kabul revolutionaries to hold on to power, also because there was no consensus in their ranks. The supporters of the old way of life, radical Islamists, began a guerrilla war. They called themselves mujahideen, which means "fighters for a just cause. In the USSR, another name was adopted - dushman, meaning "malefactors, enemies".
Dushmans control one of the roads in Herat province
"The formation of militant organizations of opponents of the new government began, they were equipped with American weapons, American and Pakistani advisers appeared. There was a direct threat of an open performance of counter-revolution, the victory of which would be fraught with serious consequences for upsetting the balance in the region, turning Afghanistan into a state hostile to the Soviet Union, into a new U.S. military base with nuclear missiles directed at the territory of the Soviet Union," recalled Politburo member Viktor Grishin, one of Brezhnev's closest associates.
The leaders of Afghanistan, which was "building socialism," constantly asked Moscow for help: finances, weapons, specialists, and, finally, direct military assistance. Mohammad Taraki, the first leader of revolutionary Afghanistan, addressed the USSR with such proposals.
Back in the spring of 1979, Brezhnev at a Politburo meeting assessed the situation this way: "I think that . it is not appropriate for us to get involved in this war now ... The participation of our troops in Afghanistan may cause harm not only to us, but above all to them...".
Participants of a rally in honor of the first anniversary of the April Revolution expressing support for Nur Mohammad Taraki, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan. April 1979
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was absolutely accurate in his assessment of the costs of putting troops into Afghanistan: "Everything we have done in recent years with such difficulty - in terms of arms détente and much more - all this will be set back.... All the non-aligned countries will be against us."
That's roughly what would happen. But within a few months, the Soviet leadership's attitude toward the Afghan problem changed dramatically. In September, the second man in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin, organized the assassination of Taraki and came to power in Kabul. By that time, it was discovered that the Americans were increasingly supporting the mujahideen insurgents, who had taken control of a large area in the west of the country. There were reasons to believe that Amin, the leader of "pro-Soviet" Afghanistan, was playing a double game and might find himself in the strong arms of the Americans, who could use a military base near the USSR. Information from the West also added to the tension: it was in those days that it was announced that Pershing-2 missiles would be deployed in Europe.
A difficult decision
At a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on December 6, 1979, it was decided to send a special detachment of 500 men to Afghanistan to protect Amin and the revolutionary government. It was clear that this was only the beginning. Amin himself asked for large-scale military assistance. KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov and Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov felt that they should take advantage of this "invitation" - and restore order in the neighboring country.
The Soviet mechanized column moves along the mountain road to the valley
On December 10-12, the Politburo made a difficult decision. The final minutes read: "To approve the considerations and measures outlined by T. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, and D. F. Gromyko." Said vaguely, but this was the beginning of the war. The paper was signed by all members of the party areopagus, except Alexei Kosygin. He believed that the issue could be solved by political means, helping Afghanistan and "pushing" Pakistan, and if necessary, Washington. The General Staff, starting with its chief, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, also opposed the introduction of troops. At a Politburo meeting, Ogarkov said that the limited contingent of up to 75,000 troops assigned for action in Afghanistan would not be able to effectively accomplish its tasks. There will simply not be enough troops to control all the hot spots in the troubled country. But the country's leadership refused to increase the contingent.
A column of Soviet armored vehicles on a city street in Kabul
Zbigniew Brzezinski was of the opinion that American intelligence had dragged the USSR into the Afghan sands with the help of disinformation. But Brzezinski is an extremely biased figure, he was performing a propaganda task. In reality, everything was more complicated, and it is impossible to deny Amin's connections with the Americans. The Soviet Union's intervention in the fate of Afghanistan in 1979 was inevitable.
International duty
On December 25, 1979, the first units of the 40th Army crossed the Afghan border. They were supported by aviation, the 13th Airborne Division, which on the same day took control of the capital's airport. It took less than three weeks to bring the unit to combat readiness.
A column of armored vehicles in the Tangi-Abrishom Gorge (Silk Gorge). Jalalabad - Kabul highway
By that time, special units operating in Kabul had already completed a secret mission - stormed the palace of Amin, who died during the operation. Moscow bet on Babrak Karmal, a representative of the moderate wing of the People's Democratic Party.
It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be garrisoned, take under guard the cities and the largest industrial facilities of Afghanistan, built with Soviet assistance. In the first days, even the order of using weapons in self-defense was not determined. But already on December 27, the first armed clashes with mujahideen detachments began. There was a civil war "all against all" in Afghanistan. And one of the sides - the Islamists - was actively supported by NATO finances and modern weapons. It is not surprising that more and more mercenary groups were formed in Pakistan and thrown into the Afghan scorcher.
Information warfare
The political cost of this move was higher than the Central Committee had anticipated. For many years, the Soviet Union had molded the image of Brezhnev as an outstanding fighter for peace and an architect of defusing international tensions. This corresponded to the character of the general secretary: knowing firsthand what a major war is, he tried his best to prevent it, not forgetting to strengthen the country's defense capabilities. But not at the cost of political concessions. The deployment of troops to Afghanistan - and even on Catholic Christmas Day - destroyed Brezhnev's "peace-loving" reputation.
Jimmy Carter - not exactly the most uncomfortable American president for the Soviet Union - could not accept the Soviet army's Afghan campaign. His administration developed a block of sanctions against Moscow. True, only Great Britain fully supported these measures of Washington. France, Germany and Italy could not give up economic ties with the USSR. The U.S. organized an international boycott of the Olympic Games, which were to be held in Moscow in August 1980. This was a political decision: the Olympic committees of the U.S. and its allies opposed such a decision.
Mujahideen with a Stinger during combat operations against government forces
On January 14, 1980, at an emergency session of the UN General Assembly, a resolution was adopted demanding the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, supported by 106 countries. And this despite the fact that the Soviet Union at that time, as a rule, had an advantage in the UN! Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, a recent ally of our country, also came out sharply in favor of the Afghan insurgent-dumans. The Arab Expeditionary Corps joined the guerrilla war in Afghanistan.
In the Soviet press about the fighting in Afghanistan reported sparingly. In the early years, it seemed that our soldiers and officers - internationalist soldiers - were only helping the Afghans in the brotherly country to establish their economy. The economic assistance that the Soviet Union provided to Afghanistan is really hard to overestimate: thousands of kilometers of highways, bridges, factories, eight oil production enterprises, gas pipelines, schools, and the famous Kabul Polytechnic University. In 1985, a plant that could produce 900 KAMAZ trucks a year started operating in the Afghan capital. But we were losing the information war.
A separate special forces battalion after a combat mission in the Kharabali area
Even in the USSR, the fighting in Afghanistan was viewed with caution, largely because no one had explained the meaning of the campaign to the public in a frank and logical manner. In January 1982, amendments to the Law on Universal Military Duty came into force, canceling deferments for many students, even those who studied at universities with military departments. This innovation was associated with the demographic hole, which was a consequence of the Great Patriotic War. But it was popularly believed that the reason for the army conscription of students was Afghanistan.
Moscow failed even to convincingly explain to its allies the necessity of sending a "limited contingent of internationalist soldiers" to Afghanistan. For both the Warsaw Pact countries and such friendly powers as India, Moscow's decision came as an unpleasant surprise. True, the boycott that the Western powers tried to organize against Soviet diplomacy could be withstood only for a few months.
A feat nullified
The army fought heroically in Afghanistan. Soldiers and officers performed feats of heroism, sacrificing themselves when the lives of peaceful locals were threatened. For nine years of combat operations 86 soldiers and officers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Of them 25 received the high award posthumously.
The Soviet military left a good memory of themselves in this country - in everyone's mind, except for those deceived by propaganda fanatics and radical militants. To this day, Afghans still say: in every yard we can assemble and disassemble a KAMAZ, a Gazik and a Kalashnikov assault rifle. Even Western journalists record: when asked "When was it better - under the Russians or now?" Afghans usually answer: "It was better under the Shuravi (Soviets). There was work then and there is none now. There was electricity then and there is none now.
The last battalion of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan returning to the homeland and crossing the Afghan-Soviet border on the Friendship Bridge over the Amu Darya River. February 15, 1989
The war lasted more than nine years and claimed 15,000 lives of Soviet soldiers. The 40th Army's withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989 was hardly triumphant. Najibullah's government asked the then Soviet government for at least fuel and weapons aid. This would have allowed them to keep the country on the brink of a large and endless war. But Mikhail Gorbachev was not interested in Afghanistan at that time. And a long era of bloody turmoil began in the ancient country.
The author is the deputy editor-in-chief of the journal "Historian"
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